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ABSTRACT
Police violence has become more visible to the public
through racial justice activism and social justice advocates’ use of
technology. Yet, the heightened visibility of policing has had limited impact on transparency and accountability in the legal process, particularly when a grand jury is empaneled to determine
whether to issue an indictment in a case of police violence.
When a grand jury decides not to indict, the requirement of
grand jury secrecy prevents public disclosure of the testimony,
witnesses, and evidence presented to the grand jury. Grand jury
secrecy leaves those who have seen and experienced the act of
police violence through activism and social media with no way of
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reconciling the grand jury’s decision with what they saw. As a
result of increased demands for transparency and accountability
in grand jury investigations of police violence, prosecutors, state
legislators, and judicial and administrative policymakers have
proposed or implemented measures to bring greater transparency to the grand jury process. However, their efforts have
had varying degrees of success.
This Article examines efforts to reconcile the doctrine of
grand jury secrecy with the public’s need for greater transparency
and accountability following the highly visible police killings of
Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice. It argues that
most of the attempts to bring greater transparency to the grand
jury process fall short because of narrow assumptions about the
concept of transparency and deep entrenchment of racial disparities in our criminal legal system. The Article considers how principles that have emerged from the heightened visibility of
policing inform a more expansive type of grand jury visibility—
one that does not merely seek to legitimize the grand jury process, but rather serves to shift power dynamics between the civilian and state. While increased transparency is not in and of itself
a means of solving systemic problems of race and police violence,
the ability to see, interpret, and influence how our current models of accountability function provides an important foundation
for those working toward a reimagining of our justice systems
and greater protections for marginalized minorities.
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INTRODUCTION
“Only the beginning and the end of the process—the apparently
reckless shooting of a black child and the grand jury’s decision
that that killing was not unreasonable—are truly public. Everything in between is either cloaked in legal secrecy or dribbled out
in carefully choreographed press releases. And when it’s over,
when the details are sufficiently blurred and the story is effectively
muddled, the prosecutor can take refuge behind those anonymous
grand jurors when he declares the whole episode to be nothing
more than a sad accident.”
—Sean Flynn1

Social justice advocates are harnessing videos displaying individual encounters with aggressive policing2 to bring heightened at1. Sean Flynn, The Tamir Rice Story: How to Make a Police Shooting Disappear, GQ MAG. (July 14, 2016), http://www.gq.com/story/tamir-rice-story.
2. The term “aggressive policing” is used to refer to street-level interactions
between police officers and civilians that are rooted in forceful or oppressive tactics and policies. Aggressive policing often includes the harsh policing of civilian
conduct that the public would usually view as innocuous. The term refers to strategies such as stop and frisk, suspicionless police car stops, and zero tolerance policing. It may also involve the capricious or excessive use of physical force, as well as
abusive behavior and language. Aggressive policing generally has a disproportionate impact on individuals and communities of color. See generally, Brett G. Stoudt
et al., Growing Up Policed in the Age of Aggressive Policing Policies, 56 N.Y. L.
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tention to disparities in the American criminal legal system. While
media exposed aggressive police-citizen encounters in previous generations,3 the advent of social media4 and a renewed movement for
racial and social justice have increased public awareness and stimulated criminal justice reform efforts.5 The blending of activism and
technology exposes a new level of policing visibility,6 deepening the
public’s scrutiny of aggressive policing. However, the impact of
greater policing visibility on prosecutorial decision-making transparency in cases of police violence has been mixed at best. In short,
policing activity is increasingly visible, but the corresponding legal
processes responsible for ensuring officer accountability remain
largely concealed. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the state
grand jury process, a part of the criminal legal system with intentionally low visibility.
When an officer kills an unarmed civilian under questionable
circumstances,7 the local prosecutor usually determines whether the
officer will face criminal prosecution. Depending on the jurisdicSCH. L. REV. 1331 (2012) (providing data and analysis on the impact of aggressive
policing on youth in New York City).
3. In 1991, long before the ubiquitousness of camera phones, the Internet, and
other social media sharing platforms, George Holliday, a Los Angeles plumber,
stepped onto his balcony and used a camcorder to record the brutal beating of
Rodney King by Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers. The video depicts three officers, as part of a group of several more, kicking King and hitting him
with nightsticks more than 50 times in less than a minute. A local news station
acquired and broadcasted the recording before cable network news stations picked
it up and broadcasted it widely. The vicious beating of King ignited already existing tensions between the LAPD and local communities of color and ultimately
lead to the 1992 Los Angeles uprisings that followed the acquittal of the responsible officers. Gil Troy, Filming Rodney King’s Beating Ruined His Life, DAILY
BEAST (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.thedailybeast.com/filming-rodney-kings-beating-ruined-his-life; Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police Brutality in America: Direct and Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as Remedies
for Victims of Police Brutality when the Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L.
REV. 271, 275 (1994).
4. BRIAN A. JACKSON, RESPECT AND LEGITIMACY—A TWO-WAY STREET:
STRENGTHENING TRUST BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC IN AN ERA OF INCREASING TRANSPARENCY 1–2 (2015), https://bit.ly/2xcvZVh.
5. See id.; see also Andrew J. Goldsmith, Policing’s New Visibility, 50 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 914, 926–27 (2010).
6. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1 (citing John B. Thompson, The New Visibility,
THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y, Dec. 2005, at 31).
7. In the United States, there is no federal statute regulating the use of lethal
force. Rather, the use of force is determined by the constitutions of each individual state. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the United States Supreme
Court established a jury standard by which an officer’s use of force can be judged.
The objective standard tasks a jury with determining “whether an officer’s actions
were ‘objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
them’ and that the ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged
from the perspective of a ‘reasonable officer on the scene.’ ” AMNESTY INT’L,
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tion, the prosecutor will either make the charging determination on
his or her own or present the case to a grand jury to determine
whether probable cause for an indictment exists.8 As a practical
matter, in cases involving suspects who are not police officers,
grand juries almost always return an indictment after a prosecutor’s
presentation of evidence.9 However, the overwhelming tendency to
indict all but vanishes when the subject of the grand jury’s inquiry is
a police officer.10 When police officers kill unarmed civilians, they
almost never face criminal prosecution.11 In Dallas, for instance,
DEADLY FORCE: POLICE USE OF LETHAL FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (2015)
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)), http://bit.ly/2xLjNuR.
8. Twenty-five states permit prosecutors to use an information or a complaint
in lieu of a grand jury indictment when making a charging determination. Those
states include: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Twenty-three states require that grand jury indictments
be used to charge serious crimes. Those states include: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Two states, Connecticut and Pennsylvania, allow prosecutors to make charging decisions and utilize the grand jury for investigative purposes only. Steven M.
Witzel, Grand Jury Practice, Protests and Reform, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 15, 2015), https://
bit.ly/2MA2dhX. For further information on how each state uses the grand jury,
see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GRAND JURIES: COMPOSITION AND FUNCTION, https://bit.ly/2Ncji6G (last visited Aug. 26, 2018). Some states also engage a
preliminary hearing option where a judge determines whether probable cause to
charge a crime exists.
9. Federal data gives some sense of this: According to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. attorneys prosecuted just over 162,000 federal cases in 2010. Grand
juries declined to return an indictment in 11 of them. See MARK MOTIVANS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES (2013), http://bit.ly/
2R9E0lX. Indeed, the widely acknowledged fact that prosecutors secure indictments in the overwhelming majority of their cases is what motivated the former
chief judge of New York state’s highest court Sol Wachtler’s infamous remark that
district attorneys “ ‘by and large’. . . could get [a grand jury] to ‘indict a ham sandwich.’ ” Josh Levin, The Judge Who Coined “Indict a Ham Sandwich” Was Himself
Indicted, SLATE (Nov. 25, 2014), https://bit.ly/1vlDVwx.
10. Philip M. Stinson, Charging a Police Officer in Fatal Shooting Case Is
Rare, and a Conviction Is Even Rarer, DAILY NEWS (May 31, 2017), https://
nydn.us/2rlO3I6.
11. Even when an indictment is filed and a police officer faces criminal prosecution, the case almost always results in acquittal. See Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015), https:/
/wapo.st/2xiPRFj (“Of the 54 officers who were charged for fatally shooting someone while on duty over the past decade, 35 have had their cases resolved. Of
those, a majority—21 officers—were acquitted or saw their charges dropped.”). In
the rare instances in which officers are convicted for shooting an unarmed civilian,
sentencing is relatively light. For instance, former NYPD officer Peter Liang was
convicted of manslaughter and official misconduct for killing Mr. Akai Gurley in
his own apartment building yet was sentenced to five years of probation and 800
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grand juries failed to indict in the over 60 cases of unarmed civilians
killed by Dallas police since 2002.12 In Houston, local grand juries
have cleared police of shooting civilians 288 consecutive times.13
Significantly, a distinct racial dimension underlies the failure to indict police violence. A substantial number of victims of fatal police
use of force are people of color.14
When a grand jury decides not to indict in a highly publicized
case of police violence, the public is often left with no way of reconciling how the grand jury reached its decision. The testimony, witnesses, and evidence presented to the grand jury are usually never
revealed to the public. Grand jury secrecy, a long-standing tradition
in American jurisprudence which requires secrecy during and after
the presentation of evidence to grand jurors, prevents evidence
presented to the grand jury from being made public. With the
grand jury process shrouded in secrecy, citizens and advocates have
found it difficult to engage in monitoring and remedying critical issues related to aggressive policing. As one scholar has noted, “By
exposing the inner workings of the grand jury, transparency could
lead to corrective processes promoting more informed, independent
grand jury decisions as a result of public criticism.”15 Therefore, the
secrecy requirement, while a long-standing legal tradition, stands in
direct tension with the contemporary need for transparency and accountability in the law enforcement process.
The heightened visibility of policing has sparked increased demands for transparency and accountability in grand jury matters inhours of community service. Matt Hansen & Matt Pearce, No Prison Time for ExNYPD Officer Peter Liang in Fatal Shooting of Akai Gurley, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19,
2016), https://lat.ms/20UTdG4. In April 2016, ex-Fairfax County officer Adam
Torres, facing trial for second-degree murder for killing Mr. John Greer in his own
doorway, pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter in exchange for a sentence of
one year of jail time. Tom Jackman, Ex-Fairfax Police Officer Who Killed John
Greer Sentenced to One Year, WASH. POST (June 24, 2016), https://wapo.st/
2MAkyv9.
12. Tierney Sneed, Garner, Brown Decisions Spark Calls for Grand Jury Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 12, 2014), https://bit.ly/2MBOIy8.
13. James Pinkerton, Bulletproof: Hard to Charge, HOUS. CHRON., https://
bit.ly/2pb9efN (last visited Aug. 26, 2018). The reality that grand juries are not
indicting police who commit violence is concerning, given that grand juries statistically almost never fail to return charges. See, e.g., Ben Casselman, It’s Incredibly
Rare for a Grand Jury to Do What Ferguson’s Just Did, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov.
24, 2014), https://53eig.ht/2u9911K (citing research from the Bureau of Justice indicating that in 2010, grand juries failed to return indictments in 11 of 162,000 cases
brought by federal prosecutors).
14. Kindy & Kelly, supra note 11; Kia Makarechi, What the Data Really Says
About Police and Racial Bias, VANITY FAIR (July 14, 2016), http://bit.ly/2OruCfj.
15. Andrew E. Taslitz & Stephen E. Henderson, Reforming the Grand Jury to
Protect Privacy in Third Party Records, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 195, 221 (2014).
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volving police criminality. Some state legislatures and prosecutors
who set policy recognize the harms of maintaining complete grand
jury secrecy and embrace the theme of transparency, but with varying degrees of opaqueness.16
This Article suggests that heightened policing visibility and social activism have initiated a shift in power dynamics between
marginalized communities and law enforcement. However, this
shift in power dynamics has yet to manifest into legal accountability, particularly in grand jury presentations where the process leading to non-indictment is shrouded in secrecy. Efforts to reconcile
the doctrine of grand jury secrecy with the public’s demands for
greater transparency and accountability following highly visible killings, such as those of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice,
have largely fallen short. This Article examines grand jury transparency efforts and suggests that their limitations stem from narrow
assumptions about the role of transparency and the impact of systemic social and racial challenges in our criminal legal system.
Part I lays the groundwork for examining the efforts toward
transparency in jury proceedings in cases of civilian killings by police officers. It explores the impact of recent developments in technology and racial justice activism that led to a heightened visibility
of police violence and the start of a shift in social power dynamics.
Part II provides the historical context of and traditional justifications for grand jury secrecy. It describes how the grand jury process
and traditional secrecy justifications are largely inapposite in highly
visible cases of police criminality. Part III uses case examples to
detail how prosecutors respond to calls for greater grand jury transparency. This part draws from each case example to suggest that
current grand jury reform efforts are largely limited to three models. Each model is discussed and evaluated for its overall impact on
grand jury transparency. Part IV argues that given the government’s monopoly on the use of violence and the United States’s
long history of oppressing racial minorities, grand jury secrecy reform measures in cases of police violence must take an expansive
view of transparency that does more than seek to legitimize the
criminal legal process as it exists. This part identifies why the shortcomings of the current approaches exist and concludes by considering what transparency modeled on the lessons from policing’s
heightened visibility would look like.

16. For a discussion of prosecutorial and legislative responses to calls for
greater grand jury transparency in cases of police violence, see infra Part III.
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I. SEEING POLICE VIOLENCE
The evolving way we observe and understand police criminality against unarmed civilians has created pressure on the grand jury
and its doctrine of secrecy. Changes in technology and social justice
activism have unmasked the complexities of race and law enforcement. This section draws from the fields of communication media,
sociology, and criminology to explore how advances in technology
have led to a “new visibility” of police-citizen interactions in the
United States. It also explores how social justice activists have
wielded heightened policing visibility to expose the normalization
of racialized police violence and challenge the lack of accountability
provided by traditional legal institutions.
A. The New Visibility of Policing
Social science scholars have observed the ways that changes in
media and technology impact the power dynamics between a government and its people. Professor John B. Thompson’s social theorization of a “new visibility” explains how the development of
communication media has significantly altered the balance of power
between government and the public.17 Historically, only the few in
power could make certain events or interactions visible to the
masses, making “visibility” a potent tool of social control.18 However, greater access to technology and media has allowed some of
that control to extend beyond only those in power.19 Ordinary people, who were once only the receivers of media information, have
now become the producers of media, making government practices
17. John B. Thompson, The New Visibility, THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y, Dec.
2005, at 31, 38. Professor Thompson writes:
Ever since the advent of print, political rulers have found it impossible to
control completely the new kind of visibility made possible by the media
and to shape it entirely to their liking; now, with the rise of the Internet
and other digital technologies, it is more difficult than ever.
Id.
18. Id. at 36–37.
19. Id. at 39–40. Thompson explores the relationship between visibility and
social control by drawing from Michel Foucault’s discussion of visibility in the
modern disciplinary society. Foucault argues that many state institutions rely on a
method of panoptic surveillance, where the few in power watch over the many. A
panoptic system of observation creates a sense of constant surveillance, without a
person actually knowing whether they are in fact being watched. The lack of certainty about when one is watched produces a sense of permanent visibility for
those possibly observed, which in turn controls their actions even without the use
of formal restraints. In more recent years, social critics have built on Foucault’s
argument to suggest that technology employed by the government, particularly in
the form of surveillance cameras in public spaces and tracking of Internet activity,
has facilitated a broader use of governmental panoptic surveillance.
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that were at one time obscured from public view “visible for all to
see.”20 This allows “those who exercise power, rather than those
over whom power is exercised” to be subject to a new, heightened
visibility.21
Technological advances, such as the incorporation of video
cameras in mobile phones and the development of video sharing
and social networking platforms, have made heightened visibility
possible. Mobile phone cameras have reached wide levels of ownership. They are compact and portable and can be used discreetly.
With connected wireless systems, mobile phones can also be used to
transmit recordings to video sharing networks, which allows usergenerated content to reach sizeable audiences.22 Most recently, the
introduction of live streaming features in social media sites allows
these transmissions to happen in real time.23 The liberalization of
publication access has created a “post broadcasting age” in which
traditional media’s gatekeeper role has been dramatically
diminished.24
Professor Andrew Goldsmith applied the concept of new visibility and its implications for the balance of power between state
and citizenry to policing.25 Police officers serve as agents of the
state, fully imbued with the enforcement power of the state. Visi20. Id. at 31 (discussing media use of U.S. military staff’s personal photographs to expose the torture and degradation of prisoners in U.S. prisons
overseas).
21. Id. at 40–41.
22. Steve Mann et al., Cyborglogging with Camera Phones: Steps Towards
Equiveillance, in THE 14TH ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MULTIMEDIA
2006 177, 177 (2006). Sousveillance “involves the recording of an activity by a
participant in the activity.” Id. Sousveillance seeks to reverse the one-sided transparency created by surveillance. In recent years, the mobile phone camera has
become a powerful sousveillance device. The phone camera allows for new mediated visibility of public officials through the eyes of marginalized individuals whose
experiences are not usually reflected in mainstream media. The broad use of
cellphone video cameras and the ubiquitous videotaping of public officials that
results—or “pervasive image capture”—could enhance public discourse and accountability. See Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 339–51
(2011).
23. Kathleen Chaykowski, Philando Castile’s Death on Facebook Live Highlights Problems for Social Media Apps, FORBES (July 7, 2016), https://bit.ly/
2OpLmQI.
24. See, e.g., John Hartley, Less Popular but More Democratic?: Corrie,
Clarkson and the Dancing Cru, in TELEVISION STUDIES AFTER TV: UNDERSTANDING TELEVISION IN THE POST-BROADCASTING ERA 20, 20 (Graeme Turner & Jinna
Tay eds., 2009) (“What counts as television is diversifying, across technology, mode
of production, viewing experience, programming, production base and geography
. . . .”).
25. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 922–30.
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bility is a key feature of policing, with officers needing to navigate
moments of both high and low public visibility. As Goldsmith describes, policing traditionally relies on positive, defined instances of
controlled visibility.26 On many occasions, police officers depend
on the identification of their role in their day-to-day activities.27
The use of uniforms, badges, and clearly marked patrol vehicles
heighten awareness of their presence within a community and signal official authority.28 Obvious markers of authority allow police
officials to employ a type of visibility that projects professionalism
and official competence worthy of public trust.29 Affirmative displays of police work also support the positive public image of policing.30 Police officers who solve crimes or take heroic actions help
maintain a positive visibility that enhances credibility.31
The public is made to understand that on occasion, police work
cannot take place in a visible manner.32 Law enforcement officers
must run covert undercover operations, and the integrity of their
investigations may depend on withholding certain information from
the public.33 Many view lack of visibility in covert police operations
as a necessary element of effective, professional police work.34 As
such, policing as a professional function worthy of credibility has
required that police officers have control of their visibility, switch26. Id. at 915.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 917.
30. Id. at 915.
31. Modern-day police forces, particularly in low-income, urban areas, also
engage in a number of visibility-based strategies aimed at maintaining social control. The use of surveillance cameras, watch towers, drones, stop and frisk, and
gang databases are all policing approaches aimed at monitoring the populace and
compiling data about their histories and actions. The strategies cumulatively echo
notions of panoptic surveillance, where the few hold an omnipresent sense of control over the many. See, e.g., Bob Hennelly, A Look Inside the NYPD Surveillance
System, WNYC (May 21, 2010), http://www.wnyc.org/story/71535-a-look-insidethe-nypd-surveillance-system (“Right now . . . if you are in a public space south of
Canal between the East River and the Hudson River, you are being watched.
Hundreds of surveillance cameras send live feeds to an undisclosed location.”).
See also K. Babe Howell, Gang Policing: The Post Stop-and-Frisk Justification for
Profile-Based Policing, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2015) (“Since 2001, the
NYPD has adopted a surveillance-based policing model . . . . [T]he NYPD’s challenge in the face of loss of legal and political support for stop-and-frisk policing is
to create a new avenue for intensive surveillance of young men of color . . . .”).
See FRANK LEISHMAN & PAUL MASON, POLICING AND THE MEDIA 123 (2012), for
a brief survey of the panoptic dimensions of modern police surveillance practices.
32. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 915.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 916.
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ing between the projection of positive “normal appearances” and
hidden tactics and activities when they deem necessary.35
However, the controlled visibility of policing also necessitates
the successful concealment of “back” activities, or police actions
that constitute improper behavior and damage credibility.36 Displays of police officers shooting unarmed people,37 using abusive
language during the course of an investigation,38 or subjecting suspects to violent, overly aggressive physical contact39 are all types of
“back” activities that undermine the official authority and “normal
appearances” upon which policing relies.40 Advances in media and
technology limit the concealability of “back” policing activities.41
The use of technology and cameras by both private citizens and
public agencies continues to heighten the visibility of police officers
35. Id. at 915–17.
36. Id. at 917.
37. See, e.g., Katherine Blaisdell et al., Race, Place and Police: The 2009
Shooting of Oscar Grant, HARV. J. AFRICAN AM. PUB. POL’Y, 2015, at 65, http://
bit.ly/2NQb44o; see also Daniel Politi, Police in St. Louis Suburb Shoot Unarmed
Black Teenager Multiple Times, SLATE (Aug. 10, 2014), https://bit.ly/1yliZTZ; Alan
Blinder, Ex-Officer Who Shot Walter Scott Pleads Guilty in Charleston, N.Y. TIMES
(May 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2CZE050; Elisha Anderson, Grandmother Says She
Watched Police Kill 7-Year-Old, USA TODAY (June 10, 2013), https://usat.ly/
2QySbkj; Paul Meincke, Family Calls for Justice for Rekia Boyd, Woman Shot to
Death by Off-Duty Police Officer, ABC 7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Jan. 9, 2013), https://
abc7.ws/2OVnULi.
38. While not a video recording, the audio captured on a cellphone during a
stop and frisk encounter reveals the police ridiculing a Harlem teen for his mixedrace appearance and threatening to break his arm. See Conor Friedersdorf, How a
17-Year-Old Changed the Politics of ‘Stop and Frisk’, ATLANTIC (Oct. 11, 2012),
https://bit.ly/2MyXqgH; see also Nicole Smith Futrell, Vulnerable, Not Voiceless:
Outsider Narrative in Advocacy Against Discriminatory Policing, 93 N.C. L. REV.
1597 (2015).
39. Tim Stelloh & Tracy Connor, Video Shows Cop Body-Slamming High
School Girl in S.C. Classroom, NBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), https://nbcnews.to/
1N3x6ZG.
40. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 917.
41. Professors Ajay Sandhu and Kevin D. Haggerty explain:
When recorded, a police officer’s actions are no longer opaque, transitory
moments in time, experienced only by the people in the immediate surroundings. Instead, they produce a semipermanent record that can be
stored, distributed widely, repeatedly reexamined, slowed down, enhanced, and compared to other recordings. Consequently, video recordings alter the spatial and temporal dynamics of policing. In the process,
cameras produce cascading and somewhat unpredictable changes in interpersonal dynamics and power relations.
Ajay Sandhu & Kevin D. Haggerty, High-Visibility Policing: Policing on Camera
and the Crisis of Police Legitimacy, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (2015), https://
bit.ly/2Oq4oX5 (internal citation omitted).
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on patrol.42 As a result, the progression of media and technology
has allowed ordinary people to make the “back” activities of government actors, here police officers, visible to all.43 Some scholars
argue that increased visibility has a significant impact on shifting
the power dynamics of policing.44 Placing access to visibility in the
hands of those subject to police power is seen as a way to bring
transparency to police actions, minimize abuse of authority, and
curtail the use of excessive force. Some argue that the additional

42. States’ systems of observation have also been used to make police activities more visible. GPS locators in cars, dashboard cameras, body cameras, and
police-owned street surveillance are some of the ways that data and images related
to police activities are captured and recorded. Issues of transparency and public
access to this information are related areas of discussion that are beyond the scope
of this analysis. See Brent McDonald & Hillary Bachelder, With Rise of Body
Cameras, New Tests of Transparency and Trust, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://
nyti.ms/2xkPslU; Radley Balko, Police Cameras Without Transparency, WASH.
POST (Aug. 21, 2015), https://wapo.st/2NgkQg7.
43. The publishing of cellphone videos on traditional and social media sites is
perhaps the most prominent example of how the actions of police officers are
made more visible to the public. However, there are a number of citizen-sourced
data-gathering “spinoffs” that also serve to function in a more organized way to
increase the visibility of policing. “Copwatching,” for example, harnesses the impact of video recording police interactions in a very deliberate way. Rather than
relying on spontaneous police filming, organized groups patrol their communities
to monitor police activity, record their observations, and prevent police misconduct. In copwatch groups, “local residents become the subjects, rather than the
objects, of policing: civilians set the terms of engagement by deciding when and
where to record, which recordings to save, who can have access to the footage, and
how to frame the narratives surrounding the release of any recordings.” Jocelyn
Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391, 396 (2016). Crowdsourcing is another mechanism that increases mobilization and policing visibility. Local citizens
and social justice organizations have built tools to access data and track officer
conduct through publicly accessed or generated information. The Legal Aid Society, for example, is building a database that collects information on allegations of
police misconduct from a variety of sources. After the killing of Michael Brown, a
group of teens developed an app that allows users to submit the details of an incident of police misconduct and provide a rating for the officer. The app also integrates community boards, allowing users to collect data, communicate, and plan
formal responses. Rebecca Borison, Three Teenagers Created an App to Document
Police Abuse, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 15, 2014), https://read.bi/VvYcAD. Another
app employs data gathering to create “a mapping system of police performance”
through “micro-moments” which will be aggregated to help police forces make
adjustments to their practices. Kaveh Waddell, An App that Tracks the Police to
Keep Them in Check, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2016), https://bit.ly/1qOCCr8.
44. Sandhu & Haggerty, supra note 41, at 5; see David A. Harris, Picture This:
Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment
Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357, 359 (2010); Manuel Castells,
Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society, 1 INT’L J.
COMM. 238 (2007); Torin Monahan, Counter-Surveillance as Political Intervention?,
16 SOC. SEMIOTICS 515 (2006).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3362435

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK101.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 13

19-OCT-18

VISIBLY (UN)JUST

13:50

13

scrutiny can ultimately lead to political action and progressive
changes in policing.45
Policing’s new visibility, Goldsmith suggests, represents the use
of a strategic resource for political action:
[T]he making visible of actions and events is not just the outcome
of leakage in systems of communication and information flow
that are increasingly difficult to control; it is also an explicit strategy of individuals who know very well that mediated visibility
can be a weapon in the struggles they wage in their day-to-day
lives.46

Marginalized individuals and organizers employed this visibility to build a base of support and advocate for reform. The next
section discusses activism around police criminality and how visibility became a central part of the movement’s efforts to recognize the
value of Black47 lives and compel grand jury reform.
B. Social Activism and the Visibility of Police Violence
Mediated visibility is a powerful, strategic resource for activists
and organizers challenging the structural inequities in law enforcement practices. Organizers use the visibility of isolated incidents of
police or vigilante violence48 to directly underscore the broader,
more obscured ways that social and legal institutions normalize the
devaluation of marginalized people.49
45. Sandhu & Haggerty, supra note 41, at 4. However, the authors question
the extent to which increased recordings of police impact their behaviors.
46. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 918. Mediated visibility refers to visibility
made possible through the use of media communication.
47. In this Article, I have chosen to capitalize the word Black as an acknowledgement of the ethnic cohesion of people of the African diaspora. See Kimberlé
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (explaining that “Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos . . . constitute a specific cultural
group”); see also Lori L. Tharps, The Case for Black with a Capital B, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2PUzu9z (placing the capitalization of “Black” in a
historical context). All citations will retain their original capitalization.
48. Official state and vigilante violence have worked together throughout
American history, with vigilante violence reinforcing both formal and informal
codes of white supremacy. See, e.g., Keri Leigh Merritt, Public, Private, and Vigilante Violence in Slave Societies, Part 3, BLACK PERSPECTIVES (Jan. 11, 2017), http:/
/bit.ly/2OUcsQg; see also David A. Love, The Trayvon Martin Case Reveals a Vigilante Spirit in the U.S. Justice System, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2017), https://bit.ly/
2OpEsuO.
49. Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy,
65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 355 (2015) (“The movement exposes to the mainstream
what black communities have argued—and black freedom struggles have organized against—for centuries: Law is not fair, it does not treat people equally, and its
violence is lethal and routine.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3362435

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK101.txt

14

unknown

Seq: 14

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

19-OCT-18

13:50

[Vol. 123:1

While activism against racialized state criminality has a long
and enduring history in the United States, the emergence of
#BlackLivesMatter as an organizing principle and rallying cry inspired a new “ideological and political intervention” in addressing
the casual killing of Black and brown people by the police.50 While
the Movement for Black Lives51 takes on a broad range of concerns
related to structural inequality and white supremacy, issues of policing and the criminal legal system have remained a primary part of
its intersectional focus.52
The killing of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin in 2013 at the hands
of George Zimmerman, a neighborhood vigilante in Sanford, Florida, is widely considered a significant origin moment for the Movement for Black Lives.53 In July 2013, after a jury found
Zimmerman not guilty of second-degree murder, Oakland activist
Alicia Garza took to Facebook to write a “love letter to black people” that soon went viral.54 This post and the phrase “Black Lives
50. In the words of the movement’s founders, Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors,
and Opal Tometi: “Black Lives Matter is an ideological and political intervention
in a world where Black lives are systematically and intentionally targeted for demise.” Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER (Sept. 10, 2017), https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/herstory/.
51. The Movement for Black Lives is “a collective of more than 50 organizations representing thousands of Black people from across the country” that formed
“[i]n response to the sustained and increasingly visible violence against Black communities in the U.S. and globally.” About Us, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES,
https://policy.m4bl.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
52. The Movement for Black Lives and its far-reaching network has mystified
some of its observers by its lack of adherence to a singular strategy, political ideology, or hierarchical leadership. As Professor Amna Akbar explains: “Short- and
long-term goals vary among members of the movement, as do the tactics, strategies, and underlying commitments to liberal, reformist, and radical politics.” Akbar, supra note 49, at 356; see also John Eligon, One Slogan, Many Methods: Black
Lives Matter Enters Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2xcyjLZ;
Sandhya Somashekhar, Protesters Slam Oprah over Comments that They Lack
‘Leadership’, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2015), https://wapo.st/2xeSh8S.
53. Patrisse Cullors, Opinion: #BlackLivesMatter Will Continue to Disrupt the
Political Process, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2015), https://wapo.st/2NiGFM7 (“#BlackLivesMatter was created in 2013 after Trayvon Martin’s murderer, George Zimmerman, was acquitted for his crime, and dead 17-year-old Trayvon was
posthumously placed on trial for his own murder. Black Lives Matter is both a
network and a movement.”).
54. As Garza wrote:
[T]he sad part is, there’s a section of America who is cheering and celebrating right now. [A]nd that makes me sick to my stomach. We
GOTTA get it together y’all. . . . [S]top saying we are not surprised.
[T]hat’s a damn shame in itself. I continue to be surprised at how little
Black lives matter. And I will continue that. [S]top giving up on black
life. . . . [B]lack people. I love you. I love us. Our lives matter.
Jelani Cobb, The Matter of Black Lives, NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2016), https://
bit.ly/2k6Am0a.
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Matter” prompted Garza and fellow organizers, Patrisse Cullors
and Opal Tometi, to take their message broadly to the streets and
social media streams. Their message set the groundwork for a
widespread movement and national conversation about race and
law enforcement, set off by a string of police killings of Black people the following year.
On July 17, 2014, Eric Garner was killed in Staten Island, New
York City, when a New York City Police Department (NYPD) officer put his forearm to Mr. Garner’s neck while arresting him for
selling loose, untaxed cigarettes.55 The interaction, along with his
dying moments where Mr. Garner can be heard yelling “I can’t
breathe” 11 times, was captured on a cellphone video recording and
broadcasted around the globe.56 A Staten Island grand jury issued
a no true bill,57 finding that there was insufficient evidence to
charge the responsible officer.58
On August 4, 2014, John Crawford III was killed in a Walmart
store in Beavercreek, Ohio, while holding a toy pellet gun.59 Store
surveillance video captured police officers shooting Mr. Crawford.60
A grand jury in Greene County declined to indict the officer who
shot Mr. Crawford on charges of murder, reckless homicide, or negligent homicide.61
55. Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises
Old Issue for the Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2n0PWdm.
56. Id.
57. A true bill is defined as: “A grand jury’s notation that a criminal charge
should go before a petty jury for trial.” True Bill, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). Therefore, when a grand jury has issued a no true bill, it is the
grand jury’s notation that there is not enough evidence to indict the accused.
58. J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury
Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://nyti.ms/2z0kbZl.
59. Mike Hayes & Ali Vingiano, The Brief Life and Baffling Death of John
Crawford III, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 3, 2014), https://bzfd.it/2QEefKy.
60. This video was not made publicly available until after the grand jury presentation. See Elahe Izadi, Ohio Wal-Mart Surveillance Video Shows Police Shooting and Killing John Crawford III, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), https://wapo.st/
2D15gAd (“Surveillance video footage showing John Crawford III being shot and
killed by police has been made public after a grand jury decided Wednesday not to
indict officers in the Ohio Wal-Mart shooting death last month.”).
61. Jon Swaine, Ohio Wal-Mart Video Reveals Moments Before Officer Killed
John Crawford, GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2014), https://bit.ly/2xdrdXz (“After hearing
from 18 witnesses and considering video and audio evidence, the jurors concluded
on their third day in session that Williams acted reasonably in shooting Crawford
dead at the store in Beavercreek, a suburb of Dayton.”). The 911 witness who
gave the officers plainly erroneous information about Crawford waving the gun at
shoppers, pointing it at children, and reloading it, was also cleared by a local grand
jury. Nick Wing, 911 Caller Will Not Be Charged for Giving Cops Bad Info Before
Fatal Police Shooting, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2016), https://bit.ly/1oFHtcc.
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On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown was killed by a Ferguson,
Missouri, police officer after he was stopped for blocking traffic.62
The officer responsible for killing Brown was not indicted by a local
grand jury.63 Civil unrest around the nation followed both the
shooting and the grand jury decision.64
On November 22, 2014, in Cleveland, Ohio, 12-year-old Tamir
Rice was shot and killed within two seconds of a police officer arriving at the recreation center where he had been playing with a toy
gun.65 The police released a surveillance video four days after the
shooting amidst pressure from Mr. Rice’s family and the community.66 A grand jury declined to indict the officers responsible for
killing Mr. Rice.
These killings only represent a portion of the recent deaths of
Black people at the hands of the police.67
62. Sarah Mimms et al., Ferguson Police Say Officer Stopped Michael Brown
for ‘Blocking Traffic’, ATLANTIC (Aug. 15, 2014), https://bit.ly/2NK3iIF.
63. Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10,
2015), https://nyti.ms/2juM9jM; Eyder Peralta & Bill Chappell, Ferguson Jury: No
Charges for Officer in Michael Brown’s Death, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 24, 2014),
https://n.pr/2CYY6MH.
64. See infra Part III.C.
65. See Elahe Izadi & Peter Holley, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting
12-Year-Old Tamir Rice Within Seconds, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), https://
wapo.st/2NLgL2J; see also Michael Lester, Timeline of Tamir Rice Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2D21jLL; Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith,
Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2QtddRk.
66. Ryllie Danylko, Protests Break Out in Cleveland Over Tamir Rice Shooting, Ferguson Grand Jury Decision, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 26, 2014), https://bit.ly/
2MA13CU; see also Flynn, supra note 1 (“What evidence is presented and how is
not a matter of public record. Nor is whether a witness is treated with deference
or, to borrow phrasing from that 74-page report, as one of the ‘purported experts’
hired by lawyers ‘representing the Rice family in a federal civil lawsuit.’ ”).
67. See, e.g., Aria Bendix, No Charges for Officers in Alton Sterling Case, ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://bit.ly/2QzD4Hx; see also Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://
nyti.ms/2Oq50vR; Yasmeen Serhan, An Acquittal in the Fatal Shooting of Terrance
Crutcher, ATLANTIC (May 18, 2017), https://bit.ly/2NJqYwO; Sarah Maslin Nir, Officer Peter Liang Convicted of Fatal Shooting of Akai Gurley in Brooklyn, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2Qx9Usv; Natasha Bach, Police Violence Has
Been Going On Forever, No Wonder People Are Fed Up with It, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 28, 2014), https://bit.ly/1BQymbJ. On October 20, 2014, an officer in
Chicago, Illinois, fired 16 shots in 14 seconds, killing 17-year-old Laquan McDonald as he walked away from police officers with a three-inch folding knife. Surveillance video of the shooting was released over one year after Mr. McDonald’s
death following a police cover up, journalist investigation, and litigation. Dashboard video of the killing was originally withheld from the public. After investigation, the officer was charged with first-degree murder. Cook County State
Attorney Anita Alvarez lost her bid for re-election in 2016, as did McGinty in
Cleveland, Ohio. See Nausheen Husain, Timeline of the Laquan McDonald Case,
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Organizers working for the Movement for Black Lives used
the visibility of these police killings to expose the insidious racism
operating behind the mainstream media portrayals of race, policing,
and our criminal legal system writ large. They successfully
prompted a national conversation about race and law enforcement.
Further, they created pressure on political and legal institutions, despite significant criticism of the movement’s diverse and provocative tactics and goals.68
Activists have used many tactics after police killings—such as
protests, disruptions of election rallies, and die-ins at local courthouses—to direct attention to the underlying systemic issues. The
continuous display of public grieving, outrage, and frustration compelled political actors to pay attention. The activism also helped
reveal the ways that the public and media remain willfully blind to
the needless loss of human life.69 For example, the national media’s
focus on Ferguson was not initially trained on the killing of Michael
Brown, but rather on the civil unrest and destruction of local businesses that followed his killing.70 Movement activists drew attenCHI. TRIB. (June 27, 2017), https://trib.in/2LO7pTI. Recent cases also highlight the
brutal, and sometimes fatal, treatment of African-Americans at the hands of police
beyond shootings, such as during arrests and in custody. See, e.g., Tom Dart, Sandra Bland Dashcam Video Shows Officer Threatened: ‘I Will Light You Up’,
GUARDIAN (July 22, 2015), https://bit.ly/2xbLsEY; see also Freddie Grey’s Death in
Police Custody—What We Know, BBC (May 23, 2016), https://bbc.in/1FuYFXP.
68. The movement was initially criticized for what some viewed as an emphasis on anger and a departure from certain civil rights movement tactics, which emphasized respectability, unity, and specific policy demands. Barbara Reynolds, I
Was a Civil Rights Activist in the 1960s. But It’s Hard For Me to Get Behind Black
Lives Matter, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2015), https://wapo.st/2D8UhoC.
69. Prior to the ascension of the Black Lives Matter movement, police shootings of African-Americans received scant, if any, attention by major media outlets.
Any major media coverage relied heavily on official sources and was often characterized by victim-blaming. For an analysis of how and why this has changed, see
Gene Demby, The Butterfly Effects of Ferguson, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 11,
2016), https://n.pr/2pbS7KZ (arguing the movement closed the social distance between Black activists and communities and national news institutions, allowing the
media ecosystem to accelerate its coverage of the issues). See also Brian Lambert,
How the Black Lives Matter Movement Is Changing Local Reporting,
MINNPOST.COM (Feb. 2, 2016), http://bit.ly/2NKISPD (discussing how local news
media has been forced to adapt due to the increased contact between Black Lives
Matter activists and national journalists, along with the intense use of social
media).
70. As journalist Wesley Lowery explained:
[B]ut it was the destruction of the QuikTrip, not the police shooting of
Mike Brown, that brought the national media’s focus to Ferguson . . .
even the breaking of a young black body left on public display, didn’t
catch the attention of the national media. It was the community’s enraged response—broken windows and shattered storefronts—that drew
the eyes of the nation.
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tion to the absurdity of this, pointing out our society’s willingness to
abide the state killings of Blacks, while reserving outrage and demands for accountability for instances of property damage.71
Organizers and activists also use social media to name the individuals killed by the police and to tell humanizing stories in a way
that counters the narratives constructed by some mainstream media
sources.72 Mainstream media vilified many of the victims for their
clothing,73 their past experiences with the criminal legal system, and
whether they talked back to the police or “resisted arrest.”74 Each
consideration suggests that somehow the victims’ fates were of their
own making. Those aligned with the principle of asserting value for
Black lives emphasized the victims’ identities as daughters, sons, fathers, mothers, and human beings worthy of more respect and dignity than the media gave them.75 The movement helped emphasize
Wesley Lowery, Black Lives Matter: Birth of a Movement, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17,
2017), http://bit.ly/2NfpFpW.
71. Transcript of Interview by Jim Gilmore with Wesley Lowery, PBS
FRONTLINE (Oct. 26, 2016), http://bit.ly/2DFZynC (“[W]e’re being lectured about
how our anger is somehow not legitimate, that our pain is somehow not legitimate;
that from the highest office in the land down to the most local offices in the land,
we as a nation are more concerned about property damage than we are lives.”); see
also Ta-Nehisi Coates, Barack Obama, Ferguson, and the Evidence of Things Left
Unsaid, ATLANTIC (Nov. 26, 2014), http://bit.ly/2OpMXpL.
72. Smith Futrell, supra note 38, at 1609 (“[P]ersonal stories are a powerful
methodology for revealing and countering this perpetuation of racial subordination and exclusion of perspectives of color.”); see also Bijan Stephen, Social Media
Helps Black Lives Matter Fight the Power, WIRED (Nov. 2015), http://bit.ly/
2OpNtnH; Renee Lewis, Ferguson Reports Raise Questions on Media Criminalization of Blacks, AL JAZEERA AM. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://bit.ly/2xfxmCv (asking
U.S. media how they would choose to represent African-American victims in Twitter campaign #iftheygunnedmedown); Bryan Adamson, ”Thugs,” “Crooks,” and
“Rebellious Negroes”: Racist and Racialized Media Coverage of Michael Brown
and the Ferguson Demonstrations, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 189, 209
(2016) (describing how the photos that media used as context for news stories
about Michael Brown served to “fuel a news narrative of Black youth and crime”).
73. Alexandra Le Tellier, Geraldo Rivera: Wearing a Hoodie While Black Is
Asking for It, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012), http://bit.ly/2NiJCMH.
74. See, e.g., Joe Soucheray, Why Didn’t Jamar Clark Take His Hands out of
His Pockets, PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 31, 2016), http://bit.ly/2p7HBEy; see also No
Charges for Ex-Milwaukee Cop Who Shot Dontre Hamilton, VICE NEWS (Dec. 23,
2014), http://bit.ly/2pccaIY (“The white officer was fired from the police force, but
prosecutors have ruled that he acted in self-defense when shooting Hamilton.
Manney claimed that he shot Hamilton after the man grabbed his baton and struck
him.”).
75. Specific campaigns have developed to address the unique positions of
Black women and Black transgender and gender non-conforming people:
#Sayhername and #Blacktranslivesmatter. See Homa Khaleeli, #SayHerName:
Why Kimberlé Crenshaw Is Fighting for Forgotten Women, GUARDIAN (May 30,
2016), http://bit.ly/2xff2cx; see also Lauren N. Williams, Trans Activist Speaking Up
for Victims of Violence and Transgender Women of Color, TIME (2017), https://
ti.me/2xlm9Az; André St. Clair, Stop Killing Us: Black Trans Lives Matter, HUF-
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the point that respectability politics only serve to diminish the lives
of those killed by the police.76
Finally, along with naming those killed by the police, the movement demonstrated that recordkeeping of the number of people
killed by police each year had been nonexistent.77 While the exact
data remains difficult to ascertain,78 it is clear that Blacks make up
a disproportionate number of those killed by the police each year.
According to FBI data, Black civilians were killed by police almost
two times per week from 2005 to 2012.79 Police shoot and kill
young Black men in particular at 21 times the rate of young white
men.80 Over the last 15 years in New York City, police officers
have killed 179 people in the line of duty, 27 percent of whom were
unarmed.81 Grand juries indicted officers in just three of those
killings.82
The visibility and activism related to police criminality promoted official measures for better recordkeeping and prompted
newspapers and social justice groups to begin implementing their
own reporting and counting efforts.83
As awareness and demands for accountability grow within the
public domain, the ways in which our legal institutions and grand
jury process fall short become even more evident. Goldsmith’s theFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2016), http://bit.ly/2paTR7j; Zeba Blay, One Year After
Sandra Bland’s Death, #SayHerName Is As Important As Ever, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 13, 2016), http://bit.ly/2p9sISb.
76. Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Black Lives Matter and Respectability Politics in Local News Accounts of Officer-Involved Civilian Deaths: An
Early Empirical Assessment, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 541, 553 (2016).
77. Wesley Lowery, How Many Police Shootings a Year? No One Knows,
WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), https://wapo.st/2Ngvovx.
78. THE NAT’L POLICE VIOLENCE MAP, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE (2015),
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/aboutthedata/.
79. Zach Newman, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot”: Policing, Fatal Force, and
Equal Protection in the Age of Colorblindness, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 117,
123–24 (2015).
80. Id.; see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 7.
81. Colin Taylor Ross, Policing Pontius Pilate: Police Violence, Local Prosecutors, and Legitimacy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 755, 757 (2016).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., THE NAT’L POLICE VIOLENCE MAP, supra note 78 (“At least 208
black people have been killed by police in the U.S. in 2015.”); see also The
Counted: People Killed by the Police, GUARDIAN, http://bit.ly/2p907MI (last visited
Sept. 28, 2018); Maya Rhodan, White House Task Force Calls for Better Data on
Police Shootings, TIME (Mar. 2, 2015), https://ti.me/2DcDGQP (noting that a recent report issued by President Obama’s task force called for improved record
keeping of officer-involved shootings); Michael S. Schmidt, F.B.I. Director Speaks
Out on Race and Police Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2MzElef
(“ ‘It’s ridiculous that I can’t tell you how many people were shot by the police last
week, last month, last year,’ Mr. Comey said.”).
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ory of policing visibility predicts that legal institutions will fail to
provide the necessary accountability:
[I]t seems highly probable that the new capacities for surveillance
of policing inherent in these technologies may increase the police’s accountability to the public . . . [m]uch, if not all, of that
accountability, however, is likely to take place in the court of
public opinion rather than through courts of law and other institutionalized channels of public accountability.84

The next section explores how the grand jury, with a deep tradition of secrecy, frequently fails to provide the kind of public accountability that the high visibility of these cases tends to demand.
II. EVALUATING GRAND JURY SECRECY
POLICE VIOLENCE VISIBILITY

IN THE

CONTEXT

OF

The grand jury is a group of local citizens charged with hearing
testimony and evidence presented by the prosecutor to determine if
sufficient evidence to charge a suspect with an offense exists.85 The
Supreme Court has made clear that the grand jury’s role is to accuse, not adjudicate.86 The grand jury does not determine guilt or
innocence, but rather decides whether a person will face criminal
prosecution. The grand jury process is one of the few places within
the criminal legal system where members of the community apply
their own perspectives and experiences to the prosecutor’s investigation of a case and charging decision.87
The grand jury is also, by design, one of the parts of the criminal justice process with the lowest visibility. The doctrine of grand
jury secrecy—which restricts the disclosure of any of the witnesses,
evidence, and testimony considered during the presentation of the
case—is a key feature of the grand jury process. Grand jury secrecy
serves to insulate all grand jury and prosecutor activity from public
scrutiny.
The increased visibility of police violence has raised expectations about the kind of transparency and accountability that our legal institutions provide in cases of significant public interest. In
order to understand the challenges that grand jury secrecy presents
in the context of highly visible police criminality, this section dis84. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 915–16.
85. See generally Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for
Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 67 (1995) (explaining the
grand jury’s role and evaluating state and federal grand jury systems).
86. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974).
87. Randall Eliason, In Defense of the Grand Jury (Part 2): Grand Jury Secrecy, SIDEBARS (May 25, 2016), http://bit.ly/2Qzj5Zh.
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cusses why grand juries were traditionally designed to operate in
secrecy. It then details the legal standards that articulate the justifications for grand jury secrecy and applies those justifications to the
police violence context.
A. The Origins of Secrecy
The practice of using grand juries was first imported to the
American colonies from English legal tradition and later made its
way into the federal government structure.88 Many scholars trace
the use of the grand jury back to 1166 with King Henry II’s Grand
Assize of Clarendon, a body composed of 12 knights who reported
incidents from each of their localities to the Crown.89 This body
was largely responsible for conducting investigations into an individual’s wrongdoing and providing local support for the centralized
authority of the King. As such, this early predecessor of the modern day grand jury did not serve to protect the rights of the individual, but rather expanded the reach of royal dominion.90
One of the earliest references to secrecy and autonomy in
grand jury proceedings is documented in the 1681 case of the Earl
of Shaftesbury.91 The Crown charged the Earl, a critic of the King,
with treason.92 The grand jurors heard evidence against the Earl in
open court at King Charles II’s insistence. After the hearing, the
jurors questioned the witnesses in private and later, despite intense
pressure, refused to indict, giving only their consciences as a reason
for the refusal.93 The Earl of Shaftesbury’s case established a grand
jury custom of hearing witness testimony in private, without the
prosecutor or defendant. As one scholar noted, “secrecy made possible the discovery of truth and protected individuals from mali88. See Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury:
Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 12–19 (1996), for
an extensive discussion of grand jury usage in English and colonial American
jurisprudences.
89. Michael K. Williams, Grand Jury: Bulwark of Prosecutorial Immunity?, 3
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 305, 307 (1972); see also PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND
JURY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1.01 (5th ed. 2012); Nicole D. Valente, Quiet No
Longer: Opening the Door for Empowered Juries and Transparency, 35 REV. LITIG. 135, 136 (2016); Hiroshi Fukurai & Zhuoyu Wang, Proposal to Establish the
Federal Civil Grand Jury System in America: Effective Civic Oversight of Federal
Agencies and Governmental Personnel, 3 J. CIV. LEGAL SCI. 1, 2 (2014).
90. William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 175 (1973).
91. Williams, supra note 89, at 307–08; GEORGE J. EDWARDS, JR., THE
GRAND JURY 29 (1906); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 2360 (3d ed. 1940).
92. Williams, supra note 89, at 307–08.
93. Id. at 308.
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cious or hateful prosecution.”94 More than just an arm of the
central government, grand juries were seen as protecting the liberties of the innocent citizen from groundless accusations of crime.95
Over time, the fear of autocracy and governmental coercion diminished in England, and the prosecutor began to attend grand jury
proceedings and assist in taking testimony.96 However, the importance of secrecy was cemented into the grand jury structure.
The early formation of the United States legal system adopted
the grand jury process. Due to its composition of laypersons, the
grand jury was regarded as a vital safeguard for the rights of individuals accused by the government, and secrecy was seen as a necessary element of this function.97 The Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees indictment by grand jury in
cases of capital or other infamous crimes. This guarantee demonstrates the value placed on the grand jury’s traditional function: “to
protect the innocent against unwarranted prosecution.”98 Although
the constitutional right to a grand jury indictment in a felony case is
firmly established in the federal system, it has not been incorporated as to the states, and as such is not required in state prosecutions.99 While “nearly all state constitutions provided for
indictment by grand jury in the early nineteenth century,”100 not all
states actually make use of grand juries.101 Each state designates
the types of cases in which a grand jury indictment must be obtained. The independent choice available to the states creates a
great deal of variation amongst state and federal grand jury prac94. Kadish, supra note 88, at 16.
95. Campbell, supra note 90, at 175.
96. See Williams, supra note 89, at 305.
97. See id. at 308–10.
98. Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2002). Grand jury secrecy reforms cannot simply focus on legitimizing knowledge that there are
limitations but create opportunities.
99. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that states need
not incorporate the right to grand jury).
100. Williams, supra note 87, at 309. Williams further noted:
The [F]ifth [A]mendment is silent concerning the procedure of the grand
jury. This meant that federal grand juries were intended to operate in
accordance with procedures established in English common law. In addition, when the thirteen colonies federated in 1787 they adopted the English common law, and by virtue of this adoption, the English grand jury
system was in force in the states. The grand jury system was, therefore,
recognized as a secret proceeding in both federal and state jurisprudence.
Id.
101. Witzel, supra note 8; Simmons, supra note 98, at 16.
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tices.102 However, reliance on the doctrine of secrecy remains fairly
consistent across state and federal jurisdictions.103
B. Challenging Secrecy’s Justifications
1. Traditional Justifications
John Somers, an eminent late 17th century legal scholar who
wrote on the early features of the grand jury, described the traditional justifications for grand jury secrecy.104 The reasons were
“first, to prevent the flight of criminals; second, to find out whether
witnesses were biased; third, to be free from judicial oversight;
fourth, to catch witnesses in their lies; and fifth, to permit the full
development of evidence for a possible indictment some time in the
future.”105 Secrecy was valued for its ability to protect both the
interests of the monarchy in discovering the truth and the targeted
individuals from malicious or hateful prosecution.106
The historical justifications that Somers articulated provided a
foundation for American judicial support of grand jury secrecy. In
1917, a Rhode Island federal district court addressed the issue of
secrecy in the First Amendment context.107 The court discussed six
foundations for secrecy that largely reflected Somers’ justifications:
(1) preventing the escape of offenders; (2) preventing the destruction of evidence; (3) preventing tampering with witnesses;
(4) preserving the reputations of innocent persons whose conduct
comes under the grand jury’s investigation; (5) encouraging witnesses to disclose their full knowledge of possible wrongdoing;
and (6) preventing undue prejudice of the public jury pool.108
102. See Simmons, supra note 98, at 16.
103. Brenner, supra note 85, at 86–87.
104. See Kadish, supra note 88, at 12–19.
105. Id. at 15.
106. Id. at 12–19.
107. See id. at 18 (citing United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524
(D. R.I. 1917)).
108. Id. at 19; see also Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the
Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339, 352–53 (1999) (“In Douglas
Oil Co. v. Petrol Oil Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979), the Supreme Court had
occasion to set out the rationales for grand jury secrecy . . . .”); George Edward
Dazzo, Opening the Door to the Grand Jury: Abandoning Secrecy for Secrecy’s
Sake, 3 D.C. L. REV. 139, 145 n.38 (1995) (“The policy reasons underlying the
American rule of grand jury secrecy were articulated in United States v. Amazon
Industrial Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931), and subsequently adopted by the
Supreme Court in Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681 n.6. (quoting United States v.
Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628–29 (3d Cir. (1954))”).
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Proponents of grand jury secrecy often note that secrecy is vital
to the protection of both the integrity of the process and the rights
of the accused.109
Secrecy is said to protect the investigation itself. If the accused
is aware of the investigation, there is concern that he or she will do
things to interfere with the process, such as destroy evidence, tamper with or intimidate witnesses and grand jurors, collude with
other accused persons, or leave the jurisdiction. Secrecy is also
viewed as protecting individual jurors and the decision-making process itself from public criticism or personal retaliation. Protection
of witnesses is of utmost concern to the courts. Secrecy in the grand
jury context empowers witnesses to testify freely knowing that what
they say will not be accessed by the accused or others. The same
argument applies to the grand jury decision-making process. Secrecy enables jurors to deliberate free from concerns about backlash. Arguably, secrecy permits jurors to weigh the evidence with
greater, more sincere reflection and deliberation.110 Proponents of
grand jury secrecy also argue that guarding witnesses, jurors, and
process integrity requires that secrecy be maintained both during
and after the grand jury process.111
2. Critique of Traditional Justifications
Although scholars question the usefulness of grand jury secrecy in the modern context,112 the requirement of secrecy remains
deeply embedded in the grand jury process. The petit jury provides
an interesting point of comparison with the grand jury, particularly
as traditional justifications for grand jury secrecy center on concerns about protection of witnesses and the decision-making
process.
With the decision-making process in the petit jury, as in the
grand jury, secrecy is a key component.113 Jurors are permitted to
weigh the evidence and come to a verdict in complete secrecy, uninhibited by fear of having their individual reflections judged by the
109. This concept is often referred to as the sword and shield function of the
grand jury. In theory, as a sword, the grand jury has the power to charge a citizen
and hold his fundamental rights in jeopardy. As a shield, it protects the accused
from governmental abuse of power by ensuring the approval of fellow citizens.
110. See Taslitz & Henderson, supra note 15, at 221. “Most states use preliminary hearings rather than grand juries in the run-of-the-mill case, yet preliminary
hearings are not protected by special secrecy rules.” Id. at 217.
111. Richman, supra note 108, at 345.
112. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Should the American Grand Jury Survive Ferguson?, 58 HOW. L.J. 825, 827 (2015).
113. Taslitz & Henderson, supra note 15, at 220.
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public.114 However, unlike the grand jury, petit juries receive the
evidence through an adversarial trial process that is tested by defense counsel and presided over by a judge in a public proceeding.115 The grand jury operates with no judge, defense counsel, or
public spectators.116 Critically, the complete secrecy of the process
serves to protect the decision-making process of not only the jurors
but also the prosecutor in ways that do not occur at trial. The prosecutor does not need to reveal outside of the grand jury process
what information he or she chose to include and exclude from the
presentation to grand jurors or how deeply (or superficially) certain
witnesses are examined.117 Secrecy also allows the prosecutor to
remain insulated from public criticism and backlash, shielded by the
“verdict” of the grand jury.118
Indeed, the principle of secrecy seems to protect the prosecutor and the government just as much as, if not more than, jurors,
witnesses, and the accused.119 Any abuses, misconduct, or overreach of discretion on the prosecutor’s part in the grand jury cannot
be revealed or addressed because of secrecy rules. The public has
no ability to examine what happened in the grand jury and the
grand jurors themselves are often barred from raising issues.120
Criminal law experts criticize the grand jury for its lack of independence due to the dominance of the prosecutor.121 Grand jurors are
laypeople relying on the prosecutor’s direction. The prosecutor
holds all of the legal knowledge. He or she tells jurors what the
charge is, what the legal standards are, and how to weigh the evidence.122 The prosecutor selects which witnesses and facts to present as well as the manner in which they are presented. The
114. Additionally, witnesses in the petit jury testify publicly at a trial and are
exposed to the same kinds of retaliation and retribution concerns that are of such
importance at the grand jury stage. These concerns can be managed at both the
accusatory stage and adjudicatory stage. Id. at 220–21.
115. Id. at 220.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 207–08.
118. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of
Unjustified Police Killings—Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
397, 406 (2017).
119. Taslitz & Henderson, supra note 15, at 220.
120. Williams, supra note 89, at 310–11. A Ferguson grand juror’s recent lawsuit illustrates the need for more transparency in the grand jury system as a whole,
starting with the admittance of testimony from former grand jurors. See Elias Isquith, “Not the Way We Do Democracy!” Why Is a Ferguson Grand Juror Being
Silenced?, SALON (Jan. 15, 2015), http://bit.ly/2xaCGqI.
121. See Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2004); Brenner, supra note 85, at 130.
122. See Brenner, supra note 85, at 72–73.
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outsized influence of the prosecutor may lead the jury to the outcome the prosecutor desires.123 In cases involving police officer
suspects, some commentators suggest that the close working relationship between local prosecutors and police departments might
lead the prosecutor to present the case in such a way that ensures
the grand jury will not indict.124 Additionally, in the event that
grand jurors had concerns that the prosecutor was acting inappropriately, they would need assistance from the very same prosecutor
responsible for the injustice in order to address it.125 As such, prosecutors have significant control over the direction and outcome of
the grand jury process, and secrecy serves to obscure the nuance of
that control.
C. Applying Traditional Justifications and Critiques to Cases of
Police Violence
Many proponents of liberalizing the rules of grand jury secrecy
in cases of police violence focus primarily on making testimony and
evidence public once the grand jury completes its work and votes
for a no true bill.126 In discussing the release of grand jury testimony after the grand jury has convened, the Supreme Court has
noted that the need to maintain secrecy becomes reduced after the
proceedings, not eliminated.127
At the post-grand jury vote stage, it becomes apparent that
many of the traditional justifications for secrecy, when applied to
cases of police violence, prove inapposite. Indeed, none of the policy concerns underlying the rule of secrecy remain at issue when the
123. See Fairfax, supra note 118, at 409.
124. See id.; Ari Melber, The Tamir Rice Case Shows How Prosecutors Twist
Grand Juries to Protect Police, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2015), https://wapo.st/
2Ngvvar.
125. Taslitz & Henderson, supra note 15, at 220. Grand juries operate under
the control of the prosecutor largely without a role for a judge, defense attorney,
or outside observers. Thus, if a grand juror had concerns about a prosecutor’s
conduct in presenting a case, it would be difficult to obtain recourse from someone
other than the prosecutor.
126. Whether it is vital to maintain grand jury secrecy while the grand jurors
conduct their evaluation should remain an issue subject to debate. The analysis in
this Article only contemplates releasing information about the grand jury process
after the grand jury convenes and issues a no true bill, not during the presentation
of evidence.
127. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979). The Court
noted that there are instances when the grand jury’s shroud of secrecy can be
lifted. Id. at 219–20. The Court acknowledged that once the grand jury disbands,
the need to ensure a fair indictment process is no longer present. Id. However, it
identified the need for grand jury secrecy as only “reduced,” not “eliminated.” Id.
at 222.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3362435

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK101.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 27

19-OCT-18

VISIBLY (UN)JUST

13:50

27

grand jury has already voted a no true bill. Four of the justifications, which concern preventing the escape of offenders, preventing
the destruction of evidence, preventing witness tampering, and
preventing undue prejudice of the public jury pool, relate to the
integrity of the ongoing grand jury investigation and potential trial
proceedings. These justifications simply do not apply when the
grand jury’s work concludes without an indictment. The remaining
justifications, which concern preserving the reputations of innocent
persons under grand jury investigation and encouraging witnesses
to disclose their full knowledge of possible wrongdoing, warrant additional discussion.
In regard to preserving the reputation of the subject of a grand
jury investigation where the jury voted no true bill, the public often
already knows the identities of police officer suspects. Reputational concern is not present in the same way that it might be for a
private civilian witness in another type of case. Further, as a public
servant accused of violence against an unarmed civilian, the individual’s duty of service to the public arguably outweighs personal
reputational considerations.
The argument that secrecy encourages witnesses to disclose
their full knowledge of possible wrongdoing pertains more directly
to an active grand jury inquiry than to one that has concluded. Proponents of secrecy suggest that in cases of police violence, an officer
or civilian witness could testify freely about the actions of an accused officer without fear of retribution or retaliation. While this
may be true during an active grand jury presentation, it is likely that
witness names would be redacted to address any safety or privacy
concerns after the investigation has concluded.128 An additional argument is that the release of testimony after the grand jury presentation concludes chills the willingness of witnesses in other future
grand juries from coming forward and testifying freely and fully.129
However, this chilling concern is based on prospective harms that
128. For additional discussion of how this chilling effect is regarded, see infra
Part III.A.1.
129. Courts must consider not only the immediate effects upon a particular
grand jury but also future grand juries. Persons called upon to testify will consider
the likelihood that their testimony may one day be disclosed to outside parties.
See Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 225–26. Indeed, the impact on the function of other
grand juries is just one of the many policy interests at play. There is quite a bit of
variation in how courts regard the impact of this chilling effect. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, for example, gives this factor little weight because state witnesses
will assume that indictments will follow and should be aware that the defendant
will receive a complete grand jury transcript and witness testimony as part of pretrial discovery.
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should not outweigh the need for access to information that is current and responsive to issues of immediate social concern.
Beyond the inapplicability of traditional justifications to cases
of police violence, the critiques of grand jury secrecy in the preceding section apply with even greater weight to these types of cases.
In highly charged and highly visible cases of police violence, secrecy
tends to protect the prosecutor. Secrecy allows information about
how the prosecutor examines witnesses and presents evidence to
remain shielded from public view. Prosecutors are allowed to take
cover behind the grand jury, a group of local community members,
when the ultimate decision is made. As the prosecutor in the Tamir
Rice case maintained, “If you don’t trust the grand jury, you don’t
trust your neighbors.”130
Prosecutors can take cover behind the grand jury, and grand
jurors have no ability to speak out and provide any information.
For example, in Michael Brown’s case in Ferguson, statutory rules
barred a grand juror who wished to speak out publicly about the
case despite the unusual public release of information.131 The dichotomy between the prosecution’s ability to hide behind the grand
jury process and the jurors’ inability to disclose what occurred ensures that any misconduct, abuse, or overreach in the grand jury
process remains concealed. If secrecy at its core is about ensuring
the integrity of the process, cases of police violence reveal how far
away the modern grand jury has moved from that value. While
grand jury secrecy was established to protect the independent decision-making of the grand jurors in their protective role between the
state and the accused, it now primarily serves to reinforce the dominance of the prosecutor. Secrecy maintains the systemic status quo
and prevents opportunities for transparency and accountability.132
III. RECONCILING POLICE VIOLENCE VISIBILITY
JURY SECRECY

AND

GRAND

Activism and the use of technology increased police violence
visibility, intensifying public demands for greater transparency and
accountability from prosecutors. Some jurisdictions responded by
increasing the frequency with which they charge police officers with
criminal offenses. In 2015, for example, a year marked by substantial activism and visibility around police violence, “eighteen police
officers were charged in fatal on-duty shootings, more than three
130. Flynn, supra note 1.
131. See Isquith, supra note 120.
132. Fairfax, supra note 118, at 406.
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times the average yearly number over the preceding decade.”133
Despite the fact that judges and juries rarely convict police officers,
the shift in charging patterns certainly seems to suggest that the attention and pressure generated by heightened police violence visibility yielded a response.134
Prosecutors and policymakers have used or proposed various
methods to ease grand jury disclosure restrictions.135 This section
briefly classifies and discusses the three most prominent approaches
used to balance the justifications of grand jury secrecy with the public’s need for transparency and accountability. This Article terms
the approaches as the Court Order Model, the Prosecutor/Grand
Jury Report Model, and the Sunshine Model. The models are introduced by case examples that involved heightened visibility of police
violence: Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, and Michael Brown. These
cases demonstrate how prosecutors provided some level of information about the charging process, ranging from basic information136
to an investigative report137 to a comprehensive release of grand
133. Margalynne J. Armstrong, Are We Nearing the End of Impunity for Taking Black Lives?, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 721, 759 (2016).
134. Charging certainly does not translate into conviction. Of the 54 officers
who were charged for fatally shooting someone while on duty over the past decade, 35 have had their cases resolved. Of those, a majority—21 officers—were
acquitted or saw their charges dropped. See Kindy & Kelly, supra note 11; see also
James C. McKinley Jr. & Al Baker, Grand Jury System, With Exceptions, Favors
the Police in Fatalities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2xbP9uk.
135. Without question there are larger issues that need to be resolved with
grand juries beyond the issue of secrecy, such as whether grand juries are the appropriate mechanism for making charging decision in these types of cases. In some
states the grand jury is required for felony charges. California momentarily abolished the use of grand juries in cases of police violence through statute. However,
a court ruling overturned that statute. See People ex rel. Pierson v. Superior Court
of El Dorado Cty., 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Ct. App. 2017), appeal denied, No.
S240238, 2017 Cal. LEXIS 2791 (Cal. Apr. 12, 2017). Other states allow the prosecutor to make the charging determination. Preliminary hearings are another available mechanism. Wisconsin passed a law in spring 2014 requiring outside state
investigators and a newly created board to file a report on officer-involved deaths
along with recommendations to the district attorney, which must be made public if
charges are not filed. The question of who should be responsible for handling
these cases is also worth consideration, given the actual or perceived conflict of
interest of local prosecutors. See Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447 (2016) for further discussion on the issue. While organizers and legal advocates pursue more sweeping measures of increased law
enforcement accountability, many view improved grand jury transparency as one
way to inform that process.
136. In re Dist. Attorney of Richmond Cty., 8 N.Y.S.3d 856, 858 (Sup. Ct.
2014).
137. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY
PROSECUTOR’S REPORT ON THE NOVEMBER 22, 2014 SHOOTING DEATH OF TAMIR
RICE, http://bit.ly/2NI8n4l (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
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jury transcripts, photos, and witness statements, respectively.138 After a discussion of the case example, each section explores other
proposals or reform efforts related to that model, if they exist. The
discussion of each model concludes by highlighting the strengths
and weaknesses of the model.
A. The Court Order Model
While each state provides its own legislative framework for
grand juries, many states that utilize the grand jury process have
fashioned statutes that fall in line with the federal approach. Under
both the federal approach and the approach taken by many states,
easing the rules of grand jury secrecy requires a judicial order.139
In Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,140 the U.S. Supreme Court identified several reasons for secrecy that centered on
maintaining the integrity of the process, yet the Court also noted
that there are instances when the grand jury’s shroud of secrecy can
be lifted, specifically upon a showing of “particularized need.”141
The Court acknowledged that once the grand jury disbands, concerns about ensuring a fair indictment process are no longer present. However, it identified the need for grand jury secrecy as only
“reduced,” not “eliminated.”142 Courts at the federal level have
138. See Documents Released in the Ferguson Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15,
2014), https://nyti.ms/2p9g1Xt; Jennifer S. Mann, Legal Experts React to Grand
Jury Process in Michael Brown Shooting, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 26,
2014), http://bit.ly/2xfaovk.
139. In the federal system, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) provides
the framework for grand jury secrecy. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. It also provides
possible sanctions and punishment for anyone who knowingly violates the rule.
No one involved in the grand jury process, other than a witness, may disclose anything occurring before the grand jury, with only limited exception. Butterworth v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 629–36 (1990) (holding that Florida statute violates the First
Amendment insofar as it prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his testimony after the grand jury’s term has ended).
140. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
141. Id. at 218.
142. Id. By this rule, district courts, as part of their supervisory authority over
the grand jury, are explicitly given the discretion to determine whether disclosure
of records is appropriate. See id. at 225–26. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that the following factors must be considered in
deciding whether to disclose: (1) the material sought must be necessary to prevent
injustice in another proceeding; (2) the need for disclosure must be greater than
the need for secrecy; and (3) the request for material must be narrowly tailored so
as to disclose only necessary information. 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959); see also Elizabeth G. Serio, Dangerous Precedent: The Consequences of Allowing Prosecutorial
Disregard of Grand Jury Secrecy, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1015–16 (2008).
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found some limited exceptions to the secrecy rule using a “flexible
test” for “special circumstances.”143
This section begins with a case example demonstrating the limitations of the particularized need standard and then discusses statutory proposals made to provide greater judicial flexibility in the
release of grand jury information to the public.
1. Eric Garner Case
As referenced in Part I, on July 17, 2014, Eric Garner died in
Staten Island, New York City, after an NYPD officer held him in a
controversial chokehold maneuver during an arrest for the sale of
loose, untaxed cigarettes.144 The interaction was captured on
cellphone video and disseminated widely across various traditional
and social media sites.145 People around the nation and the globe
had the opportunity to view the events and develop their own questions and conclusions about the propriety of the police officer’s actions. Social activism and civil unrest accompanied widespread
demands for justice. After the local prosecutor presented the case
to a grand jury, grand jurors voted not to indict the officer
responsible.
In New York, a court ruling is the only means by which grand
jury minutes and evidence can be released to the public.146 At various points in Eric Garner’s case, the prosecutor, civil liberties advocates, and other interest groups requested that the court release
information about the proceeding to the public after the grand jury
issued a no true bill. Despite these attempts to obtain information
from the grand jury, the court refused to ease the secrecy requirement in any meaningful way,147 leaving the public with scant infor143. In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that the
district court had authority to go beyond the six exceptions listed in the rule mandating secrecy of grand jury proceedings to determine whether special circumstances existed that warranted release of official transcript). The Second Circuit
has done so using a flexible test for special circumstances to release information
with “historical interest.” See id.
144. Goldstein & Schweber, supra note 55 (illustrating how the police officer
grabbed Garner around the neck with his arms, forcing Garner to the ground, and
holding him in what authorities later identified as a chokehold while Garner can be
heard saying, “I can’t breathe.”).
145. See, e.g., Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2MzRrs6.
146. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.25 (Consol. 2018).
147. The only information provided to the public in this case came from a
court request for limited disclosure from the Staten Island district attorney. See In
re Dist. Attorney of Richmond Cty., 8 N.Y.S.3d 856, 858–59 (Sup. Ct. 2014). Recognizing the importance of maintaining public trust, the court provided a “limited
incursion into the sacrosanct principle of grand jury secrecy . . . to serve overarch-
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mation about the grand jury process related to the killing of Mr.
Garner.
In James v. Donovan,148 where the Public Advocate of New
York City and other groups149 requested the release of grand jury
minutes connected to Eric Garner’s death, the court set out the applicable legal standard:
Only if the compelling and particularized need threshold is met
must the court then balance various factors to determine whether
the public interest in the secrecy of the grand jury is outweighed
by the public interest in disclosure. The decision as to whether to
permit disclosure is committed to the trial court’s discretion.150

The court noted that many of the concerns related to the traditional justifications for grand jury secrecy were not implicated in
the case in that “the grand jury declined to return an indictment,
and that the identities of the target, as well as of certain witnesses
who testified before the grand jury, are already publicly known.”151
However, the court considered “ensuring the physical safety of witnesses, and protection from public scrutiny” as justifications for
continued secrecy.152 The court also cited concerns about a chilling
effect for future grand jury witnesses in its findings.153
ing public interest.” Id. at 858. The court exercised its discretion under N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.25(4) to grant the district attorney’s application “for leave
to disclose certain limited details of the grand jury presentation in this matter.” Id.
The court granted disclosure of the time period for which the grand jury sat (nine
weeks); the total number and types of witnesses (50 witnesses—22 of the witnesses
were civilians, the remaining witnesses were police officers, emergency medical
personnel, and doctors); and the number and types of exhibits admitted into evidence (60 exhibits—four videos, records regarding NYPD policies and procedures,
medical records pertaining to the treatment of the deceased, photographs of the
scene, autopsy photographs, and records pertaining to NYPD training). Id. The
court also released disclosure of the instructions provided to the grand jury, which
induced N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 regarding a police officer’s use of physical force
in making an arrest, and that the grand jury voted to file its finding of dismissal
with the court in conformity with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 190.60, 190.75. Id.
148. James v. Donovan, 14 N.Y.S.3d 435 (App. Div. 2015).
149. Christopher Mathias, The Fight over Eric Garner Grand Jury Records
Continues, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2015), http://bit.ly/2NgvEdZ.
150. James, 14 N.Y.S.3d at 441 (citing New York v. Robinson, 781 N.E.2d 908,
908 (N.Y. 2002)).
151. Id. at 444.
152. Id.
153. The court expressed its concern stating, “Fear of future retribution or
social stigma may act as powerful deterrents to those who would come forward and
aid the grand jury in the performance of its duties.” Id. (citing Douglas Oil Co. v.
Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979)).
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In In re Application of the District Attorney of Richmond
County,154 an earlier case where the court considered the prosecuting attorney’s request for a limited release of grand jury information, the court noted that New York, by statute, requires the judicial
branch “to zealously guard the secrecy of grand jury proceedings,
the confidentiality of which is properly assumed by witnesses appearing before that body.”155 The court then balanced the heavy
presumption of secrecy with the interests of public disclosure. In so
doing, the court noted the overwhelming public interest in the proceedings, stating:
Somewhat uniquely in this matter, the maintenance of trust in
our criminal justice system lies at the heart of these proceedings,
with implications affecting the continuing vitality of our core beliefs in fairness, and impartiality, at a crucial moment in the nation’s history, where public confidence in the even-handed
application of these core values among a diverse citizenry is being questioned.156

Despite what might be considered significant factors weighing
in favor of disclosure, the court ruled in the interests of secrecy.
The court permitted only the release of limited information, such as
the length of time the grand jury sat and the number of witnesses
and exhibits presented to them.157
2. Proposals to Liberalize the Court’s Authority
a. New York
In his 2015 State of the Judiciary speech, former New York
Court of Appeals Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman recognized the
need for liberalizing access to grand jury minutes in cases where no
true bill is issued. He observed:
The public is left to speculate about the process, the evidence, the
legal instructions, and the conclusions drawn by the grand jury.
In cases of significant public interest, secrecy does not further the
principles it is designed to protect but, in fact, significantly impedes fair comment and understanding of the court process.158

In response to this reality, Lippman proposed the development
of legislation that would create a clear statutory presumption in

ITY

154. In re Dist. Attorney of Richmond Cty., 8 N.Y.S.3d 856 (Sup. Ct. 2014).
155. Id. at 858.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 858–59.
158. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: MAKING THE IDEAL A REAL3 (2015), https://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/2015-SOJ.pdf.
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favor of the court disclosing records of grand jury proceedings that
result in no charges.159 Lippman envisioned a presumption based
on two important factors: (1) both the grand jury’s investigation
and the identity of the accused were already public knowledge and
(2) the release of materials would promote a significant public interest.160 Once a court makes the necessary findings, it would be
authorized to disclose the record of the proceedings, the charges
submitted, legal instructions provided by the prosecutor, and the
testimony of all public servants and experts.161 Under Lippman’s
proposal, the prosecutor would have the opportunity to redact testimony that might reveal a civilian witness’s identity and to request a
protective order upon a showing that releasing the information
would impact an ongoing investigation or witness safety.162
b. Ohio
In a more comprehensive approach to addressing grand jury
reforms, Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor of the Supreme Court of
Ohio established the Task Force to Examine Improvements to the
Ohio Grand Jury System in January 2016.163 The purpose of the
Task Force was to improve the functioning of the grand jury and the
public’s confidence in the justice system.164 In July 2016, the task
force issued a report with ten recommendations geared toward enhancing the grand jury system.165
159. Id.
160. Id. at 3–4.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. MAUREEN O’CONNOR ET AL., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
TASK FORCE TO EXAMINE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE OHIO GRAND JURY SYSTEM
(2016), http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/publications/grandjurytf/report.pdf.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 3–4. The ten recommendations are as follows: (1) grant the Ohio
Attorney General’s Office exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute police
lethal use of force cases through its Special Prosecutions Section and the Bureau of
Criminal Investigation; (2) amend the Ohio Jury Instructions regarding the role of
the grand jury so as to emphasize the grand jury’s independence; (3) improve
grand jury orientation and education by providing a written copy of the judge’s
instructions for the grand jury to keep and encouraging jurors to re-read the instructions before hearing cases; (4) restructure Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 6
to increase clarity and reader comprehension; (5) amend Rule 6 to address the
record of grand jury proceedings, including who has responsibility for creating and
maintaining the record, as well as what is to be included in the record; (6) amend
Rule 6 to establish a standardized procedure to allow for the limited release of the
record of the grand jury proceedings; (7) create an informational grand jury video;
(8) create an informational grand jury brochure; (9) have the Supreme Court work
with other justice partners to create new outreach and educational opportunities;
and (10) amend Chapter 2939 of the Ohio Revised Code to harmonize it with the
grand jury composition and organizational requirements in Rule 6. Id. at 4.
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Grand jury secrecy was an area of significant review and analysis for the task force.166 In trying to balance the traditional justifications for secrecy with the public’s need for greater transparency, the
task force proposed allowing limited release of grand jury proceedings to the public through judicial order. The proposal includes a
presumption that grand jury proceedings, unlike other court
records regulated by the Public Access Rules of the Ohio courts,
would be exempt from public access.167 Any member of the press
or public seeking grand jury records from a proceeding resulting in
a no true bill would file a petition with the court. The petition
would “state with particularity the reason for which it is made and
how the presumption of secrecy is outweighed by the public interest
in disclosure and transparency.”168 The court could then hold a
hearing in camera for the requestor and prosecuting attorney to
present their arguments for or against disclosure.169 Records of the
proceedings could be ordered released if the court determined by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) public interest in transparency outweighs the presumption of secrecy, (2) the general public in the county of investigation is aware that an investigation has
been conducted regarding the subject matter at issue, and (3) the
general public is largely aware of the identity of the person investigated.170 The report notes that the disclosure mechanism would be
available to the public in not only police use of force cases but in
any matter where issues of public interest are implicated.171

166. Secrecy of proceedings and disclosure in Ohio is governed by Ohio Rule
of Criminal Procedure 6. Id. at 12.
167. Id. at 14.
168. Id. at 15. This is in contrast to Public Access Rules which do not require
the request to be in writing or that the person state a reason for the request.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 15–16.
171. Professor Ric Simmons, one of the members of the Ohio Task Force, said
in reference to liberalizing grand jury secrecy rules:
Furthermore, reform measures could liberalize grand jury secrecy rules
only in certain types of cases in which the cost of the secrecy is high and
the benefits of liberalizing are considerable . . . . [T]he procedure for releasing grand jury transcripts could be carefully designed to avoid opening up a floodgate of demands for every case that is brought in front of
the grand jury. For example, the rules could be amended to create a presumption of secrecy but allow a member of the public to overcome that
presumption if he or she could demonstrate that release of the transcript
were in the public interest.
Ric Simmons, The Role of the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury in Police Use of
Deadly Force Cases: Restoring the Grand Jury to Its Original Purpose, 65 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 519, 532 (2017).
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c. Evaluating Liberalized Statutory Court Order Proposals
Lawmakers have yet to act on the proposals put forth in New
York and Ohio. However, should either of the measures gain traction, they would help address the fact that the traditional justifications for grand jury secrecy do not apply in cases of police violence.
As is demonstrated by the Eric Garner case, without changes to the
governing rule or statute, courts are largely impeded from breaching secrecy even when the public interest clearly demands it. Lippman’s proposed model for New York, which includes a statutory
presumption of release, certainly creates a greater likelihood that
requestors can access grand jury materials. Ohio’s model contains
specific showings that must be made by clear and convincing evidence, which leaves release more squarely in the court’s discretion.
The Ohio “clear and convincing” standard likely creates the potential for more information access denials than the New York model.
The benefit of the Ohio model, however, is its comprehensive approach that makes the disclosure process available for any case involving the public interest.
Liberalizing the amount of information courts can release to
the public provides a step in the right direction. The proposals in
Ohio and New York both do well in addressing outdated statutory
and rule-based limitations. However, proposals that utilize the
Court Order Model still fall short of meaningful visibility for two
primary reasons. First, these proposals permit a significant degree
of prosecutorial intervention. Second, any model that relies heavily
on court intervention and augments the court’s role as gatekeeper
to the information is less than ideal. Such models largely operate to
bolster the credibility of the existing grand jury system. Furthermore, access to information is still completely controlled by the
government, which does little to tilt the balance of power between
citizen and state.
B. The Prosecutor/Grand Jury Report Model
The Prosecutor/Grand Jury Report Model suggests that rather
than providing the public with the direct evidence and testimony
presented to the grand jury, a published report would reflect some
of the evidence presented and summarize the findings and
rationale.
This section begins with a discussion of the Tamir Rice case, in
which the Report Model was used. It also details other approaches
to reports on grand jury activity. As the sections below reveal, the
Report Model can take a number of different forms. The key con-
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siderations are whether the report is required in cases of non-indictment, who the author of the report is, and what kind of substantive
information is included.
1. Tamir Rice Case
On November 22, 2014, 12-year-old Tamir Rice and his older
sister were at a recreation center near their home in Cleveland,
Ohio.172 While at the center, an observer noticed Mr. Rice playing
with what was later discovered to be a toy gun and called 911.173
The 911 caller told the dispatcher that the person observed was
“probably a juvenile” and that the item was probably a “fake”
gun.174 However, the parts of the description that indicated Mr.
Rice was a juvenile and had a fake gun were left out of the information communicated to the police.175 The call was categorized as of
the highest priority.176 The responding officers arriving on the
scene encountered Mr. Rice sitting at a concrete picnic table doing
nothing. The officer got out of his car and within 1.7 seconds fired
at Mr. Rice, fatally injuring him from less than seven feet away.
A series of protests and uprisings both nationally and locally
centered the killing of Mr. Rice within the larger national Black
Lives Matter movement. In the midst of pressure from Tamir
Rice’s family and advocates, Cleveland police released videotape
footage to the public four days after the killing.177 Over the course
of nearly a year, several agencies and individuals connected to state
and local government completed investigative and expert reports
supporting the officer’s use of force in the case. These reports were
released piecemeal to the public before a grand jury determination
was made.178
The case was finally presented to a grand jury during a twomonth time period from October to December 2015. On December 28, 2015, prosecuting attorney Timothy McGinty announced
that the grand jury had decided not to indict. At that time, McGinty also released a report serving not as an overview of what
transpired in the grand jury, but rather as a synopsis of the case
with the intent “to provide the public with (1) an explanation of the
172. Flynn, supra note 1.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Danylko, supra note 66.
178. Michael McLaughlin, Tamir Rice Investigation Turning into Another Ferguson, Family’s Lawyer Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2016), http://bit.ly/
2xkg5as.
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legal standards used to review police use of deadly force (UDF)
incidents, and (2) an overview of the facts and the process utilized
in determining whether criminal liability is present.”179 The report
noted that it was based on information that was “gleaned from the
exhaustive investigation” conducted by several state and local authorities to determine whether probable cause for criminal charges
existed.180 In short, the report provides details previously released
to the public in investigative reports and legal analyses from various
sources. As such, it does not directly discuss what evidence the
grand jury considered.181
2. Proposals Involving Grand Jury Report
a. New Jersey
In July 2015, John J. Huffman, Acting Attorney General of the
State of New Jersey, issued a supplemental directive amending a
previous Attorney General Directive on state-wide procedures and
best practices for conducting use of force investigations.182 The directive alludes to the fact that recent, highly visible instances of
deadly police force across the nation necessitated a reexamination
and enhancement of use of force investigations in the state.183
Among other wide-ranging procedures, the directive calls for a
179. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, supra note 137, at 1.
180. Id.
181. Id. Ohio does not allow for disclosure of grand jury transcripts and evidence without a court order. This case is unusual in the sense that McGinty’s postgrand jury report largely shared information from investigative and expert reports
that had already been provided to the public before the grand jury’s consideration
of the case even began. Following the grand jury’s decision, the local Cleveland
NAACP filed suit requesting release of the Rice case grand jury transcripts. However, a three-judge panel at the Eighth District Court of Appeals ruled unanimously that the NAACP did not show that it was entitled to copies of the
transcript despite the fact that McGinty had released numerous reports that the
grand jury would consider before they considered them. The court noted that
“[t]he fact that the office of the former prosecuting attorney disseminated selected
portions of the evidence presented to the grand jury under the guise of ‘transparency’ was inappropriate.” In re Investigation into the Nov. 22, 2014 Shooting
Death of Tamir Rice, 2018 OH Ct. App. 1087U, ¶ 19. It also acknowledged that
few cases have incited more community outrage. See id. Nonetheless, the court
held that “[i]t is critical to its functioning that the secretive nature of the work of a
grand jury remains sacrosanct and inviolable.” Id. at ¶ 18.
182. See Supplemental Law Enforcement Directive from John J. Hoffman,
Acting Attorney Gen., N.J. Office of the Attorney Gen. (July 28, 2015) [hereinafter Supplemental Directive], http://bit.ly/2QA5XU2. The New Jersey State Constitution and statutes provide the state’s Attorney General with broad authority to
“establish and enforce uniform statewide standards that police and prosecutors
must follow.” Id. at 1. The Attorney General establishes rules on how deadly
force is used by police officers and how use of force incidents are investigated. Id.
183. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3362435

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK101.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 39

19-OCT-18

VISIBLY (UN)JUST

13:50

39

comprehensive conflicts inquiry within the prosecuting attorney’s
office, a presumption of grand jury review in cases of police force
that result in death or serious bodily injury of a civilian, and a
mechanism for administrative review of the grand jury or local
prosecutor’s decision-making in issuing a no true bill or failing to
present the case to the grand jury.184
The directive provides:
[T]o enhance transparency in conducting use-of-force investigations, in any instance where the matter is not presented to a
grand jury for its review, or where the matter is presented to a
grand jury and the grand jury returns a ‘no bill’ . . . [the prosecuting attorney] shall prepare a statement for public
dissemination.185

The directive requires that the statement include specific findings regarding the factual circumstances of the incident and the lawfulness of the police use of force under the New Jersey Code of
Criminal Justice.186 Finally, the directive also instructs the prosecuting attorney to provide a statement explaining that he or she
conducted a comprehensive conflicts inquiry and complied with all
applicable sections of the supplemental directive.187
In describing the requirements of the prosecutor’s public statement, the directive captures the tension between the traditional justifications for grand jury secrecy and the modern public’s need for
greater understanding and transparency in the grand jury decisionmaking process. The directive advises that the statement should
comply with grand jury rules and “the need to protect the rights of
witnesses and to prevent discouraging witnesses from providing information or cooperating with investigations in future cases.”188 Finally, it states that “notwithstanding the foregoing, the statement’s
findings shall include sufficient detail about the circumstances of

184. Id. at 3. The directive also provides a mechanism for administrative review. “In any instance where the matter is not presented to a grand jury for its
review, or where the matter is presented to a grand jury and the grand jury returns
a ‘no bill’ (i.e., declines to issue an indictment), the County Prosecutor . . . shall, as
appropriate, refer the use-of-force incident to the appropriate agency for administrative review in accordance with the Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Policy
and Procedures manual.” Id. at 10.
185. Id. at 9.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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the use of force to explain why the matter is not being prosecuted
as a criminal offense.”189
b. Colorado
In May 2015, Colorado implemented legislation that impacts
the disclosure of information following the investigation of a peaceofficer involved shooting. The law provides that in instances where
the district attorney is considering charges involving a police officer
shooting a civilian and decides not to move forward with prosecution, he or she shall “release a report and publicly disclose the report explaining the district attorney’s findings, including the basis
for the decision not to charge the officer with any criminal conduct.”190 In instances where the district attorney refers the case to a
grand jury, he or she must release a statement at time of referral
“disclosing the purpose of the grand jury’s investigation.”191
The statute provides that if the grand jury returns a no true bill,
the “grand jury may prepare or ask to be prepared a report of its
findings if the grand jury determines that preparation and release of
a report would be in the public interest.”192 A report would be in
the public interest if the allegations involve the misuse or misapplication of public funds, the abuse of authority of a public servant or
peace officer, misfeasance or malfeasance with regard to a governmental function, or the commission of a class one, two, or three
felony.193
c. Evaluating the Prosecutor/Grand Jury Report Model
The Prosecutor/Grand Jury Report Model appears to have a
number of significant limitations, particularly when the report is authored by the prosecutor. For reasons discussed in greater detail in
189. Supplemental Directive, supra note 182, at 9. Interestingly, the directive
also notes the importance of community engagement before use of force investigations occur, stating: “To enhance public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of use-of-force investigations, it is vitally important for law enforcement executives
to reach out to and engage community and faith-based leaders before use-of-force
incidents occur.” Id. at 10.
190. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 20-1-114(1) (2016).
191. Id. § 20-1-114(2). Section 16-5-205.5(1) provides:
The determination to prepare and release a report pursuant to this section must be made by an affirmative vote of at least the number of jurors
that would have been required to return an indictment. The report shall
be accompanied by certification that the grand jury has determined that
release of the report is in the public interest, as described in subsection
(5) of this section.
Id. § 16-5-205.5(1).
192. Id.
193. Id. § 16-5-205.5(5).
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the next section, having the person responsible for the charging
process present information about the investigation presents many
opportunities for bias and mischaracterization, whether intended or
not. The New Jersey proposal, which requires a public statement
from the prosecutor, seems to fall very closely in line with the kind
of report issued by McGinty in Ohio when the grand jury voted no
true bill. Prosecutor reports tend to provide very little information
that sheds new light or insights on the process from a disinterested
perspective. Even further, as demonstrated in the prosecutor’s report issued in the Tamir Rice case, allowing the prosecutor to prepare the report given to the public heightens the prosecutor’s gatekeeping role. The prosecutor may be selective or even silent about
what evidence the grand jury actually considered, yet still make
claims of operating in full transparency. A prosecutor’s report also
does nothing to convey how grand jurors responded to the testimony of individual witnesses. Disclosure of the questions posed to
the witness by the prosecutors or by grand jurors can reveal
whether the grand jurors challenged or accepted the testimony provided by the witness.194
The report model established by the Colorado statute is an interesting variation from the New Jersey model, as it allows for a
report from grand jury members. Although the Colorado grand
jury report model still does not provide the raw evidence, testimony, and prosecutorial tone presented to the grand jury, it would
give the public an opportunity to gain direct insight from members
of the grand jury about their findings. However, given the concerns
related to the lack of grand jury independence and the dominance
of the prosecutor in general, the grand jury’s report may also provide limited opportunity to access additional information. As such,
because of the overwhelming influence of the prosecutor in both
models, neither the prosecutor report nor the grand jury report reflect a shift in visibility or civilian-state power dynamics.
C. The Sunshine Model
Each state, the District of Columbia, and the federal government have sunshine laws which require agencies to share informa194. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Mitch Smith, Tamir Rice’s Family
Clashes with Prosecutor over Police Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), https://
nyti.ms/2pccHdW (reporting that McGinty has been faulted for allowing the accused officers to “to read personal statements to the grand jury without being
cross-examined” while “mock[ing] and antagoniz[ing] the family’s experts so that
they could not finish explaining their findings to the jurors.”).
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tion they obtain with the general public.195 Sunshine laws relate to
transparency, openness, and accountability in government dealings.196 However, there are many exceptions to the kinds of records
that are available under a sunshine law request. Criminal records
and grand jury proceedings almost always fall under the category of
record not available to the public. This section discusses one very
noteworthy case example of a prosecutor engaging with state sunshine law provisions to make grand jury evidence available to the
public without a court order. The section concludes with an evaluation of the sunshine approach and a discussion of its very limited
applicability.
1. Michael Brown Case
On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown and a friend were walking
down a residential street near Mr. Brown’s home in Ferguson, Missouri.197 The two young men were approached by a squad car and
the officer inside told Mr. Brown and his companion to move out of
the street.198 After driving past the young men, the squad car reversed and the officer again began to interact with Mr. Brown.199
Conflicting accounts exist as to the events that transpired after this,
but evidence shows that a brief altercation occurred before Mr.
Brown was shot one time from the SUV.200 The officer fired 12
shots, resulting in seven or eight gunshots to Mr. Brown’s body.201
Records show that an unarmed Mr. Brown was shot dead within
three minutes of being stopped by the police.202 Uprisings in Ferguson lasted for more than a week, and officers armed with military
grade equipment responded to the area.203 The state brought in
various law enforcement agencies, such as the state highway patrol
and the National Guard, in an attempt to control the uprisings.204
195. THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 73 (Gregg P. Leslie ed., 7th ed. 2011), http://bit.ly/
2OqwS39.
196. Robert L. Hess II, Closed Records: Confidential, but Not Privileged from
Discovery, 65 J. MO. B. 17, 18 (2009).
197. Adamson, supra note 72, at 195.
198. Terrence McCoy, Darren Wilson Explains Why He Killed Michael
Brown, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2014), https://wapo.st/2InqbMM.
199. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING
THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN
BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 13 (Mar. 4, 2015)
[hereinafter DOJ REPORT], http://bit.ly/2pa3t1W.
200. Adamson, supra note 72, at 195.
201. DOJ REPORT, supra note 199, at 16.
202. Adamson, supra note 72, at 196.
203. Id. at 198.
204. Id. at 196–97.
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A grand jury convened to hear evidence in the case on August
20, 2014.205 Over the course of three months, the grand jury met
for 25 days and heard from 60 witnesses.206 From the beginning of
the presentation, the case was marked by a number of irregularities.207 To start, typical grand juries are not presented with all of
the evidence available in the case.208 The grand jury is usually
given the bare minimum necessary to establish probable cause and
to secure an indictment. The prosecutor also does not usually instruct the jury on affirmative defenses to the crime that he or she is
trying to establish.209 The prosecuting attorney, Robert McCulloch,
announced that the grand jury would hear all evidence, the proceedings would be transcribed, and the materials would be made
public if the grand jury did not indict.210 On the night of November
24, 2014, McCulloch announced that the grand jury would not indict
Wilson.211
As promised at the outset, McCulloch sought to release information presented to the grand jury. He originally made a motion to
the court to grant permission to disclose the proceedings but later
relied on the state’s sunshine law as a basis for disclosure.212 Missouri’s sunshine law provides the prosecuting attorney with the authority to transcribe evidence presented before a grand jury.213 The
law makes transcribed grand jury testimony a part of the prosecu-

205. Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Ferguson Timeline: What’s Happened Since the
Aug. 9 Shooting of Michael Brown, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2014), https://wapo.st/
2NRsjBW.
206. Julie Bosman et al., Amid Conflicting Accounts, Trusting Darren Wilson,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2MA0UPT.
207. See Full Airing of Evidence in Brown Shooting Was Overwhelming Task,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 30, 2014), http://bit.ly/2Qwn0Gh (detailing the
facts related to Mr. Brown’s case and analyzing the substantive irregularities
within the grand jury proceeding); see also DOJ REPORT, supra note 199, 78–86.
208. Kaimipono Wegner, We Need More Ferguson-Style Grand Juries, DAILY
BEAST (Nov. 30, 2014), https://thebea.st/2OYnfJg; see also Kate Levine, How We
Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 753 (2016).
209. Wegner, supra note 208.
210. Robert Patrick, St. Louis County Prosecutor Will Release Records if No
Indictment, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 24, 2014), http://bit.ly/2xkUfUq.
211. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2NLlRfn.
212. Id.
213. MO. REV. STAT. § 56.190 (2016) states: “In all counties of class one, the
stenographers in the office of the prosecuting attorney shall when so directed by
the prosecuting attorney of such county, take down and transcribe for the use of
the prosecuting attorney testimony and evidence before the grand jury of said
county.” Id.
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tor’s record because it is “for use of the prosecuting attorney.”214
There is no requirement that testimony be transcribed in every case
under Missouri state law.215
An investigative report becomes an open record subject to disclosure once the investigation is inactive.216 An investigative report
is a record created by a law enforcement agency examining a crime
or suspected crime in response to evidence of an incident report.217
As such, when the grand jury declined to issue an indictment in the
case of Michael Brown, the investigation became inactive and the
transcribed record for the use of the prosecuting attorney became
an open record subject to disclosure. As McCulloch noted in his
court filings, public disclosure after an investigation becomes inactive is fully consistent with the reasons for secrecy.218
2. Evaluating the Sunshine Model
McCulloch’s ability to work around the rules of grand jury secrecy was very unusual and likely to be limited to the specifics of
the Brown case. As Missouri law gives the prosecuting attorney
authority to transcribe evidence in the grand jury proceeding, such
testimony is for the use of the prosecuting attorney and becomes a
record of the prosecutor. Once the investigation is complete, it becomes an open record subject to disclosure. However, it is important to note that the prosecutor’s request that the testimony be
transcribed is what made it a public record. There is no obligation
that testimony be transcribed in every case under Missouri law. Indeed, transcribing testimony is actually a rare occurrence in
Missouri.219
In most states, grand jury proceedings are exempt from sunshine and freedom of information laws.220 Thus, there is no practi214. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Public Disclosure of Materials
Considered by the Grand Jury at 1–2, In re Special Grand Jury, No. 14SLMC15812 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 23, 2014).
215. Id. This transcribing for the use of the prosecuting attorney makes it a
record pertaining to a crime or suspected crime within the purview of section
610.100 of the Missouri Sunshine Law.
216. MO. REV. STAT. § 610.100 (1)(3).
217. Id. § 610.100(1)(5).
218. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Public Disclosure of Materials
Considered by the Grand Jury, supra note 214, at 8–9.
219. Heather Cole et al., ‘Data Dump’ After Ferguson May Be Tough Act to
Follow, MO. LAW. WKLY. (Nov. 28, 2014), http://bit.ly/2xfbd7o.
220. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Public Disclosure of Materials Considered by the Grand Jury, supra note 214, at 3. Indeed, McCulloch noted
in his memorandum to the court: “There is no suggestion that the Grand Jury is
subject to the Missouri Sunshine Law.” Id.
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cal suggestion that the sunshine law approach could be broadly
applied to other types of cases or in other jurisdictions. However,
the release of information under sunshine provisions demonstrates
two important points. First, it shows that many of the concerns that
give rise to secrecy are significantly diminished following grand jury
deliberations. Although it would be difficult to argue that the disclosures appeased anyone, disclosure did not create the grave impact that one might expect. For example, the concern about
protecting witnesses was diminished through redaction. Further,
before the case was presented, all the witnesses knew that McCullough would seek release. The witnesses were informed about the
possibility of release before testifying, and they still chose to testify.
Concerns about chilling effects on future witnesses are hard to measure, but there certainly seemed to be no negative impact on the
witnesses in this case.
Second, providing the public with all of the information that
the grand jury considered allows the public to engage in critical
scrutiny of the process. Some argue that the volume of information
presented to the grand jury overwhelmed the grand jurors and
made them unable to vote in favor of indictment. In most grand
jury presentations, the prosecutor streamlines the information making it basic enough for the grand jury to process easily. Here, the
release of information allowed the public to see the kind of treatment the police officer received in the grand jury proceedings. The
prosecution presented extensive evidence, the officer was allowed
to testify, and witnesses favorable to Mr. Brown were cross-examined and discredited.221 The treatment was not typical, and it
heightened concerns that the prosecution reserves more favorable
treatment for white police officers who kill unarmed Black men.222
What the documents do and don’t say provides key insights into the
grand jury process that the public would not be able to evaluate if
absolute secrecy were maintained.
IV. MOVING CLOSER

TO

GRAND JURY VISIBILITY

Greater access to information about a grand jury’s decisionmaking in cases of police violence is certainly not a panacea for
issues of excessive police force and accountability in the United
States. However, for those working toward a reimagining of our
justice system and greater protection for marginalized minorities,
221. Monica Davey et al., Raised Hands, and the Doubts of a Grand Jury,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2Oq6rdR.
222. Jeffrey Toobin, How Not to Use a Grand Jury, NEW YORKER (Nov. 25,
2014), http://bit.ly/2xmBQpZ.
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the ability to see and interpret how our current models function and
where they fall short provides an important foundation.
As underscored in the preceding section, prosecutors and
policymakers are considering various ways of providing some level
of access to grand jury proceedings in cases of police violence which
result in no indictment. The development of these efforts suggests
that the heightened visibility of policing is impacting state and local
policymakers. Yet, as the highlighted state and local approaches to
greater transparency reveal, how policymakers regard transparency
and its goals can vary widely. This Part argues that focus on traditional notions of transparency can prove more distracting than illuminating for those seeking a better understanding of prosecutorial
and grand jury decision-making in cases of police criminality where
no indictment is issued. It identifies why the shortcomings that result from the current approaches exist and concludes by drawing on
principles from policing’s new visibility to theorize a more meaningful approach to grand jury visibility.
A. The Transparency Distraction
In cases of police criminality, liberalizing access to grand jury
decision-making when an indictment is not issued has largely been
focused on notions of transparency. When it comes to democratic
governance and the administration of justice, transparency is often
considered a good thing.223 Indeed, prosecutors running for office
frequently do so on a platform of promises to bring greater transparency to the system. However, as the approaches above demonstrate, transparency can be a very amorphous concept, with more
notional than practical meaning. Transparency’s elusive practicality
often allows its provider to define its meaning and parameters, as
shown in the case examples above.
Those familiar with the inner workings of the administration of
justice are well aware that most of the decision-making that takes
place within the system occurs in ways that are rarely visible to the
public.224 Transparency is purposefully diminished at many moments, yet these moments are not seen as inconsistent with the
goals of transparency. For example, discussions in judicial cham223. Various individual constitutional rights related to criminal justice are embedded with transparency norms, such as the right to a public trial and the right to
confront one’s accusers. With the pervasive use of plea bargains and other pretrial practices as means of case resolution, only a nominal percentage of cases ever
proceed to a public trial.
224. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 923 (2006).
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bers are generally not open to the public, nor are jury deliberations.
The details of ongoing prosecutions are often shielded from public
scrutiny out of concern that openness will jeopardize the process of
investigating and adjudicating wrongdoing. Ongoing grand jury investigations fall into this category. However, the heightened visibility of police violence renders the lack of transparency after the
grand jury concludes without an indictment unacceptable. Prosecutors’ and policymakers’ willingness to take on the cause of “improving transparency” in these types of cases is only logical. Doing so
creates political and structural benefits: it creates a sense of responsiveness to public outcry and helps to reaffirm the legitimacy of a
system the outcry calls into question.
As long as the doctrine of secrecy remains sacrosanct, anything
the prosecutor shares is more than the public would otherwise receive. When advocates receive more information about the grand
jury process from the prosecutor than the doctrine of secrecy would
traditionally provide, they are given a sense of having more access
to procedures and decisions that will ultimately lead to greater accountability. By providing some information where there otherwise
would have been none, prosecutors can at least provide the illusion
that they are being completely transparent. Take for example the
words of prosecuting attorney Timothy McGinty in the Tamir Rice
case:
[T]ransparency is needed for an intelligent discussion of the important issues raised in police use of deadly force cases. This approach by our office has ended the protocol of total secrecy that
once surrounded the use of deadly force by law enforcement officers. When a citizen is purposefully killed by police, the results
of the investigation should be as public and transparent as
possible.225

While this statement seems to strike the right tone in terms of
recognizing that it is vital for the public to have access to investigative information in cases of police violence, it actually serves to reinforce the illusion of transparency. McGinty’s version of
transparency was still selective in what information was provided
and strategic about when certain information was released. McGinty revealed investigative reports before the grand jury was actually convened, which some suggest influenced the grand jury pool.
The prosecutor’s version of transparency did little to provide meaningful access and information for advocates and citizens seeking
reform.
225. McLaughlin, supra note 178.
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The Brown and Rice cases demonstrate that transparency is
largely an ideal and that there are key practical considerations
which ultimately prove limiting to those seeking clear information
that can drive advocacy efforts. Prosecutors are the primary holders of decision-making authority and processing information at the
grand jury stage. However, transparency requires prosecutors to
share information openly with the public and others who stand
outside of the law enforcement structure. Although prosecutors
are, for the most part, publicly elected officials charged with representing the interests of the people of their jurisdictions, they are
hardly “disinterested producers and providers of information.”226
Prosecutors are political actors who, despite operating under a tremendous degree of insulation through protections such as
prosecutorial immunity and discretion, must still navigate the complex challenges that come from being a public servant and a local
government’s chief legal enforcement official. Cases where police
officers kill unarmed civilians present some of the most fraught representations of prosecutorial tensions. It would be naive to presume that prosecutors can provide insights about their influence
and decision-making process within the grand jury as pure information without intended or unintended bias, alteration, or
distraction.227
Prosecutors and local policymakers carefully manage and define transparency by setting the terms of what information to disclose and how and when to disclose information. The power that
government and institutional actors possess allows them to control
and “shape possible ways of perceiving and talking about transparency.”228 As governmental actors increasingly control the terms
of transparency, they create the likelihood of prematurely curtailing
real engagement about the relevance, nature, and quality of grand
jury disclosures.229
226. Lars Thoger Christensen & George Cheney, Peering into Transparency:
Challenging Ideals, Proxies, and Organizational Practices, 25 COMM. THEORY 70,
74 (2015). In fact, there has been much discussion about prosecutorial interest and
conflict of interest in these types of cases.
227. Id. at 75 (“Operating with flawed notions of senders, messages and receivers, the transparency ideal ignores major developments within the field of communication and upholds unrealistic expectations of insight into organizations,
institutions, and governments.”).
228. Id. at 80.
229. Christensen & Cheney, supra note 226, at 84 (“In many uses of transparency, thus, we find examples of what Deetz calls ‘discursive closure’: the premature truncation or containment of a discussion, in this case, even in the announced
interest in democracy.”).
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One key area of access to information that does not come from
the state is information from witnesses who testify. Grand jury secrecy rules do not apply to witnesses testifying before the grand
jury. They have no limitation on discussing what they said, saw, or
experienced before the grand jury. One example of the usefulness
of a grand jury witness’s statement relates to the Tamir Rice case,
where interviews of grand jury witnesses provided much of the public information available about the case.230 Another slightly ancillary strategy relates to the issuance of grand jury reports, much like
what the Colorado statute provides. Although grand jury reports
must be authorized by state statute, the strategy provides an opportunity for grand jurors to release public reports accusing individuals
of misconduct or criminal activity even if they are not indicted.231
These reports are often justified in cases involving the public
interest.
B. Racial Justice, Police Violence, and Legitimacy
Another shortcoming of the traditional belief about transparency in the approaches discussed above is that transparency can
and should lead to greater criminal justice legitimacy. As this section discusses, efforts to bring about grand jury transparency would
be more effective if they were not simply oriented around affirming
credibility of the process. Those engaging with notions of transparency must acknowledge historic and systemic shortcomings and
be open to the groundwork necessary for improvement.
In managing and defining the terms of transparency, prosecutors and policymakers often cite ensuring trust and legitimacy in the
justice system as one of the purposes of liberalized disclosure.
Building up the legitimacy of the justice system corresponds to our
traditional ways of thinking about transparency. Transparency, as
related to democratically oriented processes and norms, relies on
“the ability of the citizenry to observe and scrutinize policy choices
and to have a direct say in the formation and reformulation of these
decisions.”232 Proponents of transparency in the criminal legal system suggest that open access to information can help to dispel sus230. Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Restoring Independence to the Grand Jury: A
Victim Advocate for Police Use of Force Cases, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 535, 555
(2017) (“[O]ne source of public information about what occurred in the Tamir
Rice grand jury are interviews given to a journalist by several of the witnesses who
testified in that proceeding.”).
231. Gregory D. Morril, Prosecutorial Investigations Using Grand Jury Reports: Due Process and Political Accountability Concerns, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 483, 497 (2011).
232. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1164 (2000).
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picions and allow individuals to evaluate the decision-making of its
representatives. Arguably, transparency can ultimately lead to
deepened trust.233 As one scholar noted:
As a program for accountable government, transparency demands high visibility in official decision-making . . . . Moreover,
transparency requires not only visibility of policy choices but a
publicly declared rationale for these decisions. Requiring government to announce both positive action and normative justification acknowledges the human desire to assess the bona fides of
public officials.234

To varying extents, the public received transparency of positive
action and normative justification with the grand jury disclosures in
the Brown and Rice cases. While perhaps not “high visibility in
official decisionmaking,” the public did receive some opportunity
“to observe and scrutinize policy choices” and some degree of a
“publicly declared rationale.”235 Yet, while challenging to measure,
it would be difficult to argue that the disclosures led to the public’s
deepened sense of trust in the system.236 Part of the problem rests
on the fact that the information releases were designed to legitimize
and sustain the system as it exists. While ensuring legitimacy in the
system as it exists is perhaps a laudable goal in the abstract, the
notion again overlooks practical realities about race and disparities
of experience with the criminal legal system.
For many Blacks in particular, criminal justice trust and legitimacy is already a deeply fraught concept rooted in a collective experience and history. Observing how cases of police violence seem
to avoid accountability simply affirms that understanding. Prosecutors and policymakers often fail to acknowledge the experiences of
people of color and prioritize creating the perception of trustworthiness without considering what transparency that creates the reality of trustworthiness might involve.
The non-indictment of officers in police violence cases and the
grand jury secrecy that keeps testimony and evidence concealed
only tend to support the long historical and practical experiences of
exclusion that racial and social minorities face. For many Black and
Latino people in the United States, disparate treatment in the criminal legal system in arrests, plea offers, and sentencing is an endur233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Some argue that the way prosecutors McGinty and McCullough handled
the Tamir Rice and Michael Brown cases diminished the trust of their constituents
and led to the eventual loss of each of their prosecutorial re-election campaigns.
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ing reality. In recent years, with increasing attention paid to the
causes and impact of mass incarceration, outside observers are now
able to recognize these disparities, even if they don’t impact their
perceptions of fairness. Studies show that when compared with
their white counterparts, African-Americans have less confidence
in police officers and do not believe that police treat racial minorities fairly.237 A recent Reuters poll shows that only 28 percent of
African-Americans trust the police to be fair and just, while 61 percent of whites believe the police to be fair and just.238 These trends
are also observed in perceptions about the criminal legal process.239
Indeed, studies examining racial disparities at the arrest, prosecution, and sentencing stages of criminal adjudication demonstrate
that Blacks and Latinos experience worse outcomes than similarly
situated white individuals.240
While there have been many causes identified for disparities
along racial lines in perception and outcomes in the criminal justice
system, it is evident that the United States’ long-standing history of
reinforcing racial hierarchy through its legal institutions is a significant factor. The grand jury itself contributes to this history. The
grand jury, while often criticized, is also lauded for sustaining democratic ideals, such as requiring local members of a community to
participate in the early stages of the criminal adjudication function
of government. Some observers suggest that grand jurors selected
from the community are best suited to assess the facts of a case
237. Ross, supra note 81, at 765–67. As one author notes:
People are more inclined to follow the law when they believe that it is
legitimate, even when it produces outcomes with which they disagree.
More specifically, people see the law as more legitimate when they think
that legal procedures and the system’s overall treatment are fair. Scholars have termed this notion procedural justice. The fundamental idea is
to communicate to citizens at all times the reasons why an agent of the
criminal justice system is doing what she is doing, and to give an opportunity for that citizen to be heard. When this type of engagement is absent,
resentment builds . . . . But when present, legitimacy has tremendous
power: one study found that even serious offenders were more likely to
comply with the law when they believed both in the law’s substance and
in the legitimacy of the actors enforcing it.
Id. at 765.
238. Bill Schneider, Do Americans Trust Their Cops To Be Fair and Just?
New Poll Contains Surprises, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2015), https://reut.rs/2xgrS9M.
239. PEW RESEARCH CTR., KING’S DREAM REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL;
MANY AMERICANS SEE RACIAL DISPARITIES 12–13 (2013), https://pewrsr.ch/
2pcnzsu.
240. See generally BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO,
PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN NEW YORK COUNTY (2014), http://bit.ly/
2NMtWjZ.
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given their localized perspectives and experiences, which may prove
particularly useful in highly charged and emotional cases.241
However, the grand jury’s populist orientation has not always
been used in ways that protect the interests of racial and cultural
minorities.242 Quite to the contrary. Following the Civil War,
grand juries acted in ways that legitimized and reinforced white racial dominance. For example, grand juries in southern states regularly refused to indict white people accused of committing acts of
violence against recently freed Black men and women.243 In the
post-war period, grand juries were noted for “indict[ing] members
of the occupying northern army for property damage . . . and blacks
on the New Orleans police force for assault and false imprisonment
of white citizens.”244
While members of the grand jury historically used their discretion to very visibly maintain racial regimes,245 such exercises of discretion continue to operate in low visibility in ways that contribute
to the disparate perceptions and outcomes of Blacks involved in the
criminal legal system. Outside of the view of public scrutiny, people of color and other marginalized groups are subjected to targeted
policing practices, unauthorized displays of force, and unwritten
rules of conduct.246 Policing actions taken on marginalized minorities, often undetectable within the deep limits of officer discretion,
241. Grand jurors selected from the community may be seen as contributing
community voice and conscience to charged and emotional cases. Eliason, supra
note 87. As Professor Roger A. Fairfax, Jr. explains:
However, much of the grand jury’s value lies in what it represents and its
capabilities. A lay entity, the grand jury can function as the voice and
conscience of the community. Our constitutional system’s view of the
jury prefers the wisdom of common citizens to the professional competence of judges and prosecutors. By having its say in what charges might
be visited upon an accused, the grand jury preserves the popular perspective in the administration of criminal justice—particularly given that most
criminal cases today result in a guilty plea and are never presented to a
trial jury.
Fairfax, supra note 112, at 829.
242. Simmons, supra note 98, at 14 n.64 (discussing how laws aimed at the Ku
Klux Klan that were passed during the Civil War period were “virtually impossible
to enforce” because grand juries refused to indict the defendants); see also Roger
A. Fairfax, Jr., Batson’s Grand Jury DNA, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1511, 1514 (2012)
(discussing the history of excluding Blacks from local grand juries).
243. Simmons, supra note 98, at 14.
244. Id. The Supreme Court has established that a grand jury has the right to
decline to indict even when the evidence satisfies the probable cause standard. See
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986).
245. See Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2333, 2376 (2008) (discussing how the modern grand jury prevents minority groups
from exercising influence over the evaluation of criminal laws).
246. Luna, supra note 232, at 1131–32.
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form what one observer calls a “shadow code.”247 The shadow code
is a set of surreptitious practices and policies that are all too familiar to the marginalized individuals who experience it, but it is often
invisible to those who do not.
The shadow code extends to the adjudication of officers accused of violence, creating what many perceive to be a two-tiered
system of justice. Holding officers accused of criminality to a separate set of standards that fail to penalize their misconduct supports
the concept of de facto decriminalization of police violence. Professor Peter L. Davis defines the de facto decriminalization of police
brutality:248
[W]hen an act, though still deemed criminal by the legislature or
common law, no longer results in sanction because the criminal
justice system simply refuses to punish violations of the law—at
least under certain circumstances. De facto decriminalization
does not require the abandonment of all prosecution under the
law. If only a very small percentage of the known violators is
prosecuted (or convicted), however, at some point the sanction
associated with the crime becomes so remote that the crime is
effectively or functionally decriminalized.249

The causes of police violence decriminalization are varied.
Some causes include the prominence of the police function in modern society, the willful blindness of the public and institutional actors to the realities of police criminal behavior, the close working
relationship between prosecutors and the police, unchecked
prosecutorial discretion, and diminished grand jury
independence.250
During this political and social moment, Black people are grappling with the overwhelmingly punitive and wide-reaching impact
that mass incarceration has had on individual lives, families, and
communities. The damage that mass incarceration has inflicted on
communities of color is only compounded when police officers who
are video recorded committing violence against unarmed civilians
247. Id.
248. Davis, supra note 3, at 275 n.10. Professor Peter Davis describes how
society’s inability to use appropriate nomenclature when discussing police behaviors also contributes to a sense of de facto decriminalization. As he describes:
“The use of terms like ‘police brutality,’ ‘police misconduct,’ and ‘excessive force’
demonstrate our conscious or unconscious judgment that assaults by police officers
are not really crimes.” Id. at 286.
249. Id. at 275 n.10.
250. Id. at 275.
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avoid charges through a process protected by secrecy.251 Trust and
legitimacy are difficult to achieve when a two-tiered system of justice continues to exist.
Police officers have a monopoly on the use of state violence to
reinforce social order. When fatal acts of violence are employed
against unarmed civilians, particularly in ways that are racialized
and can be observed broadly by the public, long-standing harms
that exist in this country deepen. As one scholar noted, “When the
law reaches outcomes that are substantively unjust, or at least not
visibly just, citizens view the law’s judgments as less credible and
less worthy of respect.”252 Communities of color have grown to expect that the law will reach judgments that are “substantively unjust, or at least not visibly just.”253 Without recognition of what
communities of color have learned to expect, transparency in service of legitimacy is an empty endeavor.254 Transparency should
not be about simply trying to get people who have no reason to buy
into the system to do so. Transparency should be about acknowledging why there is no buy-in, acknowledging things don’t work
well for everyone, and laying the groundwork to bring about
change.
C. What Is Grand Jury Visibility?
Transparency is not in and of itself a means of solving the complex social and systemic problems, such as how to obtain accountability for police criminality. However, rethinking transparency and
moving towards a less one-sided, top-down sense of visibility can be
a step towards revealing how complex social and systemic problems
become entrenched within our legal process.
251. See Kami Chavis, Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring Trust and
Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors, 49 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 137, 147–48 (2015).
252. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 51
(2012).
253. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 950 (2006).
254. Ross, supra note 81, at 766. One author explains:
Ferguson, Staten Island, and Cleveland are not the only instances in
which grand juries failed to indict police officers for the killings of unarmed black citizens. But they triggered outrage in part because people
believed they represented such a clear corruption of the process by local
prosecutors–a lack of procedural justice. Some protesters likely cared
more about results than procedures. A protest against a particular result,
however, does not necessarily implicate the system that produced it. As
the procedural justice studies have found, citizens can tolerate adverse
results so long as they have a sense that the system functioned fairly.
Id.
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The new visibility of policing tells us that in order to move toward greater visibility within the criminal legal system, advocates
cannot rely on prosecutorial benevolence alone to obtain vital information about grand juries. Those concerned with understanding
decision-making processes in the grand jury and revealing underlying structural inequities must find ways to make access to grand
jury information unavoidable.
Transparency suggests there is something to see, while visibility
provides alternative routes to access and present it. Visibility is different from transparency in the sense that visibility allows access to
information that the prosecutor or the government may not readily
disclose. The information itself is not subject to initial interpretation by the government. Visibility is challenging in the grand jury
context because unlike policing visibility, where individuals have
more open access to police activity, the grand jury process is so
guarded that advocates must often rely on information provided by
the government to see what has transpired. Given the state’s monopoly on the use of violence and this country’s long history of oppressing marginalized minorities, grand jury secrecy reform
measures in cases of police violence must take a more expansive
view of information sharing. The measures must not be guided primarily by prosecutors and must do more than seek to legitimize the
criminal legal process as it exists. Any actions the state takes to
provide greater transparency should advance liberal presumptions
in favor of release and approaches that favor open access.
CONCLUSION
Social activism and its use of technology and media has led to a
heightened visibility of policing, which has elevated and connected
individual occurrences of police violence. Social activism’s use of
technology and media has also impacted public expectations of accountability and justice in our criminal legal system, particularly
concerning the state-level grand jury. To some extent, the visibility
of policing caused institutional actors, such as prosecutors, judges,
and other policymakers, to reconsider the scope of grand jury secrecy. Some policymakers are developing ways to maintain the integrity of the grand jury process while providing the public with
some measure of transparency. However, openness in government
action should do more than legitimize the existing system and further marginalize the very people it should be serving. This Article’s
goal is to surface critical questions about the quality and limitations
of the transparency efforts regarding grand jury secrecy in cases of
non-indictment of police officer violence.
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Principles drawn from policing’s visibility have the potential to
expand our understanding of information access. This Article does
not suggest that activism, technology, and media can bring the same
level of visibility to police violence cases presented to the grand
jury as it does for incidents that unfold on the street. It also does
not claim that greater transparency in the grand jury will solve issues of police violence and unequal justice in communities of color.
Rather, this Article argues that there are core values to be drawn
from the visibility of policing that can guide how advocates and
policymakers consider transparency’s role in improving or
reimagining the grand jury process and other parts of the criminal
legal system.
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